
Rashid Shaz
Understanding the
Muslim Malaise

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A Conceptual Approach in the Indian Context

Rashid Shaz

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Milli Times Building
Abul Fazl Enclave, Jamia Nagar
New Delhi-25
INDIA
Tel: +91-11-6926246, 6325499, 6323053
Telefax: +91-11-6323053
Email: militime@del3.vsnl.net.in

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PREFACE

This book is about a devastating tragedy that befell the Muslims in post-'47 India. In the pages that follow one gets acquainted with a revolutionary Ummah which, in its ideological wilderness, shuns its idealism and is eventually swallowed up by a seemingly neutral ideology of secularism. This conversion of Muslim Indians, from Islam to secularism, though in itself a clear case of apostasy, has otherwise gone unnoticed. This little book focuses on this painful and heart-rending phenomenon.

This book is intended only as a frank and honest exposition of the problem. Those who flick through its pages for any latest facts and figures about Indian Muslims will certainly be disappointed as I have purposely avoided the trappings of modern sociological tools. I believe that statistical tables or sociologically obtained facts and figures are, in most cases, misleading when applied to such multidimensional issues. At their best, they can bring forth only a camera-like picture of the social scene conveniently ignoring or, rather, being insensitive to, the beneath the surface realities that a camera is not made to capture. Instead, I have tried to focus around the basic question as to what is the real cause of our decline?

During the last fifty years we Muslims have perfected the art of living in death. For us death is a continuous and a never-ending phenomenon. Such is the magnitude of our sufferings that even a death is not available to put an end to our

miserable existence. Trapped in a blind ally we feel that our fate is sealed. An ostrich-like attitude then occurs to us as the only alternative. Afraid of yet an uncertain future, most of us find solace in clinging to this deathlike existence putting all our already bellied hopes in a Cruiso-like approach that one day some unseen hands would come to our rescue. The purpose of this book is, precisely, to expose this fallacy.

The book does not focus on a possible solution, nor is it intended as a future work-plan. I sincerely feel that the solution to our problems lies in our ability to pose the problem in its bare nudity. And this is no easy task. If this small book is successful in giving a true exposition of the problem and if our readers get convinced that these questions do exist, I believe the book has achieved its objective and we have made some progress towards finding a solution.

— Rashid Shaz

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم

UNDERSTANDING THE MUSLIM MALAISE

INTRODUCTION

The Malaise of Indian Muslims epitomizes, to a great extent, the crises of the international Ummah of Islam. The general feeling that something has gone awry and the failure of our intellectuals to point out clearly that 'something' has further compounded the crises of the Muslim mind. Like Muslims in other parts of the world the Indian Muslims too live in a world which they have not created willingly and which does not go hand in hand with their not-so-hazy Islamic aspirations. Never before in 1400 years long Islamic history, or for that matter, during a thousand years of their positive history in the subcontinent, Muslims had to adjust themselves with an alien system which openly de-recognized Islam as the guiding principle and yet they, as loyal citizens of free India, were expected to honor the new national creed, the secular democracy. As this situation had no semblance in Islamic history they could not find much solace and guidance in the classical *fiqhi* debate which in most cases, with ill-found analogies, further confused the issue. Those who turned towards the Islamic heartland found the situation more depressing; the nation-state system had left no room for a concerted effort or a single solution for the fragmented ailing

Ummah of Islam. The wise among us therefore suggested that Muslims living in respective nation-states should, at least for the time being, forget about the outside world and find their solutions within the national boundaries.[1] A national or local solution to the international problem was not only doomed to fail but it also contributed in placing the real, vital issues on the back burner, in effect obliterating them altogether.

Today any sincere attempt to grasp the essence of the Muslim question in India is obstructed by very many divergent, conflicting and, at times, misleading arguments. There is a plethora of literature available on the topic both by Muslim and non-Muslim scholars yet it is difficult to ascertain what is the real problem or the root cause of all such problems. True, the issue at hand is no simple proposition and therefore one should not expect a single answer in a linear direction. But what is worrying is the fact that the wisdom expressed in thousands of pages written on the topic does not converge on a similar set of answers rather they tend to diverge making it impossible for the reader to get to the crux of the problem. Most of the contemporary authors on the subject, at their best, look at the Muslim question as a 'minority issue' which certainly it is not. It is like taking a urine sample for the blood test. What lies at the heart of the problem is the 'Islamic*ness*' of the Muslim question and not the 'minority*ness*'[2] that the contemporary scholars would like us to believe.

We begin with the assumption then that the problem lies in our inability to pose it in its bare nudity. In the pages that follow an attempt will be made to answer the most perplexing question of our time: what has gone wrong with the Muslim Indians? Where lies the root cause of all their ills or what can be termed as the mother of all their problems? However, the assumption to discover the problem is not aimed at finding

a difinitive answer, the aim is to give our attempts a definitive direction.

THE PROBLEM

First, an exposition of the prolem:

The history of Muslim Indians does not begin on 15th August 1947. It may however, appear to be ending on this date, though. It is interesting to note that the Ummah which had displayed exceptional courage in the 1857 tirade against the British, the same people, within the span of 150 years or so, were so demoralized that they felt unsafe from the same Hindu population with whom they had a long history of living in peace and harmony. To understand the factors involved let us refresh in our memories some important events of history. The emperor Aurangzeb, that great symbol of Muslim power in the subcontinent died in 1707. Within 150 years the situation came to such a pass that all efforts to arrest the fall of Delhi failed in 1857. The fall of Delhi was no ordinary event. For the first time in their history Muslims found themselves at the mercy of an alien system. Delhi had eventually fallen to the British and the new rulers were successful in terrorizing the people and apparently all hopes for a reversal of the situation had died down. Yet there was no dearth of people who could still harbor the idea of retaking Delhi, howsoever difficult it might appear though. No doubt, the debacle of 1857 had demoralized the Ummah, the Muslim mind had yet to reconcile with the stark reality which had made them subjects of non-Muslim rulers. The numerous armed struggles led by the *Ulema*, the open declaration of India as a *harbi* land and the religious *fatwa* to this effect were cases in point. However, the failure of the Khilafat Movement, the dismantling of the Turkish Empire and the very

termination of the institution of the Khilafah created a general atmosphere of gloom and despair. It was not for the first time that the Ummah had received a major set back. Ups and downs are quite natural in the history of nations. Beginning with the defeat of Islamic army in *Ohad* down to the sack of Baghdad in 1258 A.C., the Ummah had not only experienced tragic events, it had also successfully devised ways to turn a crisis situation into an opportunity. But the process of decline engineered by the fall of Delhi in 1857 shook the Muslim political thinking to its foundation. The situation was so grim that neither our intellectuals nor the traditional *Ulema* could successfully meet out the challenge. Hence onward various attempts were made to reconstruct the Muslim polity along Islamic lines. But the Ummah had yet to receive a final blow, marking the eventual collapse of the Khilafah-State on 3 March 1924. As the Indian Muslims were up-front in the Khilafat Movement they naturally had to share the maximum gloom resulting from its collapse. The fall of Khilafah-state disillusioned all those who had put their hopes in outside support and who, for some reason or other, were waiting for some miracle to happen. Now the defeat was total and final. This led to the emergence of a new thinking among the Muslims, the need to create a new *Fiqh* for a situation of submission and surrender.

The period between 1857 to 1947 is marked by a major transformation in the Muslim political thought. The crisis that the Muslim mind underwent during these 90 years will be taken into account later. At this point I only want to emphasize that the intellectual and ideological confusion that surrounds 250 million Muslims of India today has its roots in some major strategic lapses which have yet to be understood in full and analyzed in proper perspective.

Those who look at the problems of Indian Muslims as the minority issue and try to solve them accordingly must not ignore the fact that such a large community of Muslims did not come into existence overnight or so suddenly on 15th August 1947. Although on this very date they were given a new name and a new identity, that of a minority. In India Muslims have a long majestic history. They might be called as Muslim Indians but ideologically and emotionally they are an integral part of 1.5 billion strong Muslim population scattered all over the world. Today they appear as a hapless lot and the Islamic mainland is in a state of total ruin. The collapse of the Islamic political system, it so appears, has left no room for any hope for any future revival yet, even in this state of fragmentation, there remains a common feeling among the Muslims that they are no ordinary people but the remnants of the Ummah of the last Prophet, the upholders of the global agenda of peace and justice. The political power has gone, the dream is shattered but the hope for a revival of the past very much survives.

A change in the outlook of Indian Muslims, the way they look at their history, is very much possible. The secular system, it so appears, has already made some progress on this front. Nevertheless, there is a general feeling among our policy makers that despite fifty years of secular indoctrination the Muslims, by and large, still cling to their majestic past and look at their history as a strategy for future. As for those who look at the Indian Muslims as a mere minority and consider their problems as minority issues they fail to understand the religious and ideological dimensions of the problem. There are people among us who complain that during the last 50 years the collective performance of Muslim Indians has not been even at par with other minorities. They fail to understand

that the ever-declining graph of the Muslims in various fields also owes something to their ideological makeup. The mental and ideological makeup of the Muslims is not that of a minority, hence they cannot excel as such. It is like expecting a better performance from a jet aircraft while taxiing. In contemporary India all our attempts to understand the Muslim issue are out of place, rather misplaced, much in the same way that the Indian Muslims feel about themselves in secular India, a 'misplaced nation'.

Any attempt to understand the Muslim issue in proper Islamic prospective will naturally lead us to another basic question, about the nature of Islam itself. Can Muslims lead an Islamic life or be true to Islamic ideals in a secular setup? Is there any Islamic sanctioning for Muslims to live as a 'protected minority'? And the crucial question: can the Islamic agenda of global justice prosper in an alien system or go hand in hand with the ideals of a secular democracy? An in-depth enquiry into the nature of the problem involves some basic questions about the very authenticity of the version of Islam popular among Muslim Indians of our time.

It goes without saying that the issues that Muslim Indians confront today or for that matter the basic ideological issues that have engulfed the global Ummah as a result of the fall of the Khilafah, are so unique that the problem has no precedent in Islamic history. From day one Muslims believe that their *deen* is complete and final. The model of ideal Islamic life transmitted and practised by the Prophet himself had enough room to accommodate the changing needs of human society without compromising on the essence of the message. The earlier *Fuqaha* of Islam had successfully displayed the adjustment of the social model in accordance with the changing situations and therefore it never occurred to the

Muslims, even in their distant dreams, that they can organize their social life on a pattern other than that of Islam. As for the new situation where Muslims came to call themselves as a minority it was in itself not that unique. The group of Muslims led by the Prophet himself was, in the early era of Islam, a minority. But this minority was destined to swallow the majority and dominate it. In the Quranic worldview an ideological minority holds the potential power to topple and dominate the majority.[3] True, the new situation, that of Secular India, was unique in Islamic history but for Muslims finding themselves as a minority in a non-Islamic system was not so unique. Here comes a basic question: If Muslims had the experience of facing an alien system as a minority earlier in their history, why in Secular India their response was so diametrically opposed to the earlier responses? Without taking into account these basic questions one cannot or their history has become an inseparable part of their existence, there should be reasons for it.

MUSLIMS AND THE FORMER DARUL-ISLAM

The fact is generally missed that Indian Muslims, before the creation of secular India, have always considered themselves to be an integral part of the international Ummah of Islam. Muslims of this land, in *fiqhi* terminology, always considered this country a Darul-Islam. And the Muslim rulers of this country were obliged to enforce the *Shariah* and maintain a linkage with the central Islamic Khilafah howsoever nominal or ceremonial this linkage might be. Later, India attained a very special place in the central Islamic political structure owing to the development of Islamic learning and scholarship. Geographically India was not in the mainland but intellectually and politically Indian Muslims

never felt that they were on the periphery of the *darul-Islam*. In our time some historians have made deliberate attempts to undermine the Islamic importance of India. According to their view the term 'Muslim government' is a British invention for giving a communal interpretation to history. As for the history of Muslim rule in India, according to this view, it has been the history of some dynasties, which happened to be Muslims. This interpretation of history might be helpful for those who are desperate to create a new *fiqh* ignoring India's status as the former *darul-Islam*, but it cannot stand to any serious scrutiny. Muslim dynasties, even if established by the might of the sword, trace their legitimacy in Islam. What is important in a *fiqhi* debate is the source of legitimacy of a political power. And the Muslim emperors in India, other than the Mughals, always drew their legitimacy from the central *Khilafah*. They might appear to be full-fledged kings, yet they never considered themselves as more than mere helpers of the Khalifah. A formal decree from the court of the Khalifah was supposed to be essential for making an Indian Muslim ruler legitimate. The Muslim masses believed that through these rulers, who owe their allegiance to the Khalifah, they too are linked to the central structure and are part of the international Ummah. The Friday sermons were the public proclamation of this legitimacy where the Imam used to mention the Khalifah as well as the local Muslim ruler in the capacity of his Deputy or Helper.

We have enough historical evidence to prove that as early as in the Ummaiyah era, Sindh was formally annexed to the *darul-Islam*. And in the Abbasi period Sindh's cultural annexation was complete and total. In 871 the Abbasi Khalifah Al-Motamid nominated Yaqub bin Laith as the Governor of Sindh. During his tenure, the Friday sermon throughout

Sindh proclaimed Motamid as Khalifah of all Muslims.[5] Later, even when Sindh witnessed political instability the *Khutbah* of the Khalifah continued to be read. The link, though severed for some time due to political upheavals, remained intact symbolically. The Khalifah though may not appear to have a direct control on the Indian territory, the symbolic allegiance to his authority was very much felt. It is recorded that the sack of Somnath by Mahmud Ghaznavi brought to him titles and honors from the Khalifah.[6] Mahmood's coins bore the name of Abbasi Khalifah besides his own as *Nasir*.[7] The same attitude was displayed by the Slave dynasties. Sultan Shamsuddin Altamash (1211-36) is also said to have received the investiture of the Abbasi Khalifah Al-Mustansir as a legal sanction to establish his authority in North India.[8] Silver coins of Altamash's time bore the name of Khalifah Al-Mustansir on one side and on the other side his own as helper of the Khalifah. The view that a Muslim ruler in India drew his legitimacy from the Khalifah only as being his helper was a generally accepted opinion. Without an open proclamation of their allegiance to their Khalifah, rulers of this period considered their authority illegitimate and shaky.[9] Even after the sack of Baghdad in 1258 which resulted into the death of Khalifah Al-Mustasim, coins in India bore his name.[10] The legend had its symbolic value. The Khilafah had gone, but the rulers in India, in order to draw legitimacy, felt compelled to call themselves as helpers of a Khalifah who was no more. The legend itself was an essential ingredient of Muslim political thinking and without being a Nasir Amirul-Momenin or Yamin al Khilafah (of a hypothetical Khalifah), no ruler could have claimed to be legitimate.[11]

Jalaluddin Khilji (1290-06) who succeeded the slave

Sultans and came to power nearly 50 years after the sack of Baghdad still found the theory of a nonexistent Khalifah attractive and essential for drawing up legitimacy. From Allauddin Khilji (1296-1316) down to Mohammad bin Tughlaq (1325-51) the rulers of Delhi proclaimed themselves only as helpers of the Amirul Momenin. Mohammad Bin Tughlaq was so particular about this concept and about the composite totality of Darul-Islam that without a formal investiture from the Khalifah he regarded the rulers as usurpers. He considered this situation as more serious than apostasy.[12] Burni has mentioned that Mohammad bin Tughlaq had sought an investiture from the Abbasi successors of Al-Mustasim, living at that time in exile in Egypt. When this ceremonial investiture from Al-Mustaqfi reached India the event witnessed a public celebration and scenes of jubilation. The same Khilafah investiture from the Khalifah-in-exile also came to Firoz Tughlaq (1351-88). Like his predecessors, Firoz Tughlaq also believed that 'it is by his sanction that the power of the King is assured, and no King is secure until he has submitted himself to the Khalifah'.[13]

In the light of such historical evidences one can safely conclude that before the establishment of Mughal rule in India, rulers in India considered themselves as appointed agents of the Abbasi Khalifah. Inscription of Khalifah's name on the coins and the proclamation of his name in the Friday sermons had created a general feeling among the Muslim masses that they were no less than the citizens of the Khilafah-state, the *darul-Islam*.

Owing to the absence of the Khalifah at the time when Mughals established their rule in India, the institution of Khilafah could not attain a key importance. The cultural link of India with the mainland nonetheless further strengthened

during this period. Islamic scholars from the mainland traveled to India in search of better prospects. By then it was an established tradition to offer important positions in government especially in *qadha* (Judiciary) to those *Ulema* who had completed their education in the mainland of Islam. The idea of being a part of the central Khilafah state was no more attractive in the Mughal India, though. The new definition of *darul-Islam* had laid down two basic criteria; that the ruler must be a Muslim and the *Shariah* be the main apparatus of governance.[14] The ideological foundation of the Mughal empire was in itself a heresy but the very presence of the *Shariah* helped fill the ideological void, or at least created such a feeling. The fall of the Mughal empire in India brought the Ummah, for the first time, face to face with a non-Muslim government thereby initiating the debate whether Muslims can accept a non-Muslim rule ignoring the central importance of the institution of Khilafah in Islam. To meet this long due ideological need Muslims in the subcontinent accepted Sultan Abdul Aziz as the global Khalifah and the mentioning of his name became a part of Friday sermons throughout the subcontinent.[15] It is a historically established fact that Indian Muslims till the termination of the Ottoman Khilafah in 1924 considered themselves as ideological citizens of the *darul-Islam*.

THE GENESIS OF THE PROBLEM: INTELLECTUAL DIASPORA

The two major blows, one after another, that devastated the Muslim Indians dismantling the very structure of their *milli* lives were; the fall of Delhi in 1857 and the termination of Khilafah in 1924. With the fall of Delhi started a fresh debate among Muslim intellectuals as how they should define themselves in the new situation. Now they were no longer

citizens of a *darul-Islàm*. For the first time in their *milli* life they felt the need for a new agenda or at least a new strategy suitable to the new reality. Later, the termination of the Khilafah and the dismantling of the Khilafah-state placed them in a situation, perhaps for the first time in their history, when they discovered themselves to be the hapless subjects of the British Empire. Now, the break from the Islamic mainland was total. Owing to these new stark realities they got accustomed to look at this global tragedy from a local angle thereby devising a local strategy to solve an international problem. The Muslim malaise was no more an international issue, as Indian Muslims looked at themselves as British subjects. The destiny of Indian Muslims, they felt, was now linked to the British Crown. The chief exponent of this view was Sir Syed Ahmed Khan, a man whose story is the history of the later half of the nineteenth century Islam in India. Howsoever sincere, and pragmatic for that matter, Sir Syed appears to be, he is the main figure in the nineteenth century Islam who tried to furnish Islamic legitimacy for the non-Muslim rule. One of the reasons may be, as Shibli Nomani has rightly pointed out, that he considered himself to be a Nasiruddin Tusi or an Allauddin Juveni of his time, who had to write the agenda for a community that had already lost the battle. But whatever the explanation one may find for Sir Syed's words and deeds, his pragmatism later paved the way for a future *fiqh* of complete surrender. And once the intellectual framework was broken it became utterly difficult to recast it again in its original dye.

Sir Syed and his followers met with stiff opposition but those who opposed his pragmatism had equally failed in formulating a viable alternative. The critics of Sir Syed, therefore, could not prove to be creative as they were unable

to correct the intellectual digression that had already set in. The fall of Delhi had created a vacuum in the creative as well as intellectual life of the Ummah and the situation demanded no less than a *mujaddid*, the visionary of his age, to help revive the traditional Islamic thinking. The task before the new *mujaddid* was much more complex than that of Sheikh Ahmed Sirhindi as he had not only to reinterpret and revive the Islamic thought but also set the fragmented house of Islam in order. The traditional Waliullahi school which had long been talking of *Ijtihad*, unfortunately failed to come up with a creative and timely response. Despite a very stiff opposition from the *Ulema*, the Muslim mind came very much under the influence of Sir Syed and other intellectuals of his ilk. The traditional *Ulema* adopted a very narrow approach, taking up *Taqleed* as their modus operandi at a time that was demanding a fresh approach, in fact no less than a reconstruction of Islamic thought. Since the *Ulema* failed to impress upon the people that for the new situation they have a viable alternative, the modernists and pseudo-modernists found it easy to exploit the situation and push forward their own version of Islamic agenda.

As referred to earlier, Sir Syed was the first to justify the legitimacy of non-Muslim rulers on Islamic grounds. To achieve this objective he even went as far as misinterpreting some of the well-known traditions of the Prophet regarding *darul-Islam*. Sometimes his interpretations were so ridiculous that they appeared as clear expressions of sycophancy: 'we have been told by our religion, by our God, by our Prophet to obey the authority no matter be he a Negro or a Slave'.[16] And as for the Britishers, their authority is legitimate because, he writes: 'They are much better than the Negroes, they are the white people and there is no reason why we shouldn't obey

these white people whom God has appointed as our rulers. We must obey them and in this way willingly accept God's verdict.'[17]

Once a non-Muslim ruler became acceptable on Islamic grounds it pushed the entire Islamic concept of *al-wala wa al-bara* into oblivion. It was a major digression in Islamic thought, rather a turning point that put a seal on any future revival of Islam in the subcontinent. If the fall of Delhi had deprived Muslims of a Muslim-state, the new interpretation of Islam by Sir Syed gave a serious blow to the very foundations of Islamic ideology. And once the basic framework was broken and the ingredients of Islamic thought became debatable, it became easy for the Muslim mind to move in any direction. This engineered a process of intellectual diaspora among Muslims, a journey which is still on, towards a destination unknown.

Sir Syed considered himself to be the new interpreter of modern Islam. He was convinced that the traditional religious thought was unable to cope with the new situation. In his opinion those who were struggling to change the situation altogether were mere romantics. He therefore considered it to be the need of the hour to recreate a new *fiqh* based on a fresh understanding of Islam. It is interesting to note that the political views of Sir Syed were well received and they won the followers from among different strata of the society but his religious views and Quranic exegeses found almost no support from even his close associates. The ultra-rational Mo'tazalite approach to Quran was not only down played by Shibli, Hali and Vaqarul Mulk but more than that it found no place in the syllabus of M.A.O. College. Sir Syed's recognition as a political visionary and a as pragmatic leader, could not establish him as an authentic and popular interpreter of

Islam. Rather, the right to reinterpret Islamic dogma, remained very much in the hands of the *Ulema* of Waliullahi School. Those who came to regard Sir Syed as the only pragmatic leader of the time and trusted his worldly wisdom had the notion, somewhere in their minds, that they had not broken totally with the traditional Islam where the *Ulema* were still regarded as the only authentic interpreters of Islamic *Aqeeda* (dogma). This duality of thinking, the division of Islam into the political and the religious later paved the way for a new school of Islamic understanding in free India, a point we will return to later.

Islam has always a romantic attitude towards future. Sir Syed's rationalism in religious matters and his pragmatism in political issues deprived the Muslim mind of 'romantic optimism'. Islamic history is a mixture of past glory and future aspirations for a global system of Islam. The eventual goal of the Muslim community, of which we are told by the Prophet himself and for which Muslims have been active throughout their history and will have to be active till its establishment, is in itself a romantic idea. The Islamic agenda, as Muslims understand it, is to work for the unfinished task, to help shape a future history of their choice, a process initiated by a man no less than the Prophet himself. That Muslims are the community of the last Prophet, upholders of a global mission of peace and justice, the last and only hope for this troubled world, obliged to work tirelessly till the objective is achieved, or they lose their lives for this cause — such ideas constitute the very core of Islamic teachings and their romantic associations cannot be ignored. The Muslim view of history, that it is basically to be controlled by the Ummah, and their vision of the future of a yet stronger control of history, was opposed to the pragmatism that Sir

Syed had put forward as a future work-plan. The dream of a majestic future could not survive, partly because of Sir Syed's pragmatic utterances, thus leaving the Ummah devoid of a vision for the future. Further, Sir Syed looked at the Muslim Indians as a geographical group rather than as a part of the international Ummah, and, therefore, he tried to find a local solution to their problem. This was yet another digression from the mainstream Islamic thinking. He openly declared that as a British citizen he had nothing to do with the Turkish Khalifah and that he considered himself religiously obliged to obey the dictates of the British only.[18] Such a purely local thinking was an innovation in the Muslim thought; firstly, for the first time in their history Muslims were told that they now, being the British subjects, were not religiously obliged to have any link with the Islamic mainland or declare any allegiance to the Khalifah; secondly, the institution of the Khilafah was not that central to Islam as, according to this view, it was brought to an end soon after the fourth Khalifah and what followed him was not Islamically binding;[19] thirdly, Indian Muslims should invest the authority of the *Uolul-Amr* in the person of a local ruler rather than wandering in search of a Khalifah. No matter if this local ruler were a non-Muslim or one who had come to power through coercive means.

Shibli Nomani, a close associate of Sir Syed in his search for a modus operandi for the revival of the Ummah came to believe that the root cause of the decline of Islam lay in our dislike for rationalism. According to him the decline was engineered in the 13th century Baghdad when *the Asha'era* had finally won over the *Mo'tazala.* To me Shibli's statement is only partially true. I personally believe that the root cause of our decline lies not in the defeat of *Moa'tazala* but, more so, in the eventual victory of *Asha'era*. Had the *Mo'tazela* thinking

been defeated by something else, the history of Islam would have been different today. Once the *Asha'era* established their intellectual supremacy, it belied all hopes for a fresh look at the Quran and Sunnah. Traditionalism rather than *Ijtihad* became the order of the day. Jamaluddin Al-Afghani who unlike Sir Syed raised the banner of global Islamic revival traced the root cause of Muslim malaise in the crisis and confusion in the Muslim mind that came to full view during the Abbasi period.[21] The Khilafah was no longer that strong as to direct and control the Islamic thought, the reason being the Abbasi Khulafa themselves had developed a habit of exploiting Islam for their own political ends. This intellectual confusion or the *fitna* encouraged the orthodox *Ulema* to take the road to *taqleed* as the safest possible option. Whereas Afghani considered a central body of Muslims an essential prerequisite for *Ijtehad*, Sir Syed and his associates had the feeling that they were qualified to do it on their own.

Sir Syed and his associates were wishfully optimistic about the viability of their approach. They were confident that unlike the rationalist movement of the Abbasi period, this time their neo-rationalist movement would help create a fresh and healthy approach to Islam. But this attempt at the reconstruction of the Islamic thought further intensified the intellectual crisis, adding to it some more confusions. Same as in the Abbasi era, the Greek rationalism had blocked the progress of Muslim thought, and it took the Muslim intellectuals almost 200 years to clear the way; similarly, Sir Syed's political and religious views brought the progress of Muslim thought to a stand still for almost a century and a half. Some of his political ideas became so popular among Indian Muslims that they were taken as part of Islamic *Aqeeda*, a legacy the Ummah has yet to give up.

Afghani was a vehement critic of Sir Syed; he considered him a man who for some petty material ends was ever willing to compromise on the Islamic message and who had no self respect at all.[22] Afghani, unlike Sir Syed, came to believe that the root cause of the Muslim malaise was not in the traditionalism itself rather it was in the understanding of traditional Islam and in our unshakable belief in *taqleed* as the only viable strategy to protect the falling structure of Islam. Himself a vocal exponent of *Ijtihad*, Afghani rejected *taqleed* but at the same time did not approve of Sir Syed's modernism. Discovering the lost nucleus of the Ummah, the institution of Khilafah and the revival of united Ummah of Islam along purely Islamic lines became his motto. In Afghani's scheme of things the Ummah is one, international in out look, and the global *Uolul-Amr* its very backbone. To him the malaise of Ummah was international in nature hence a national outlook was doomed to fail in finding a solution. He had witnessed the decline of the *darul-Islam*; the major setbacks at the military fronts, the ever-shrinking territory of the Khilafah state — clear indicators of an eventual fall, but what he felt more alarming was the dismantling of the Islamic thought itself; for once the thought structure had gone it was difficult to reconstruct the Islamic frame work and revive or reorganize the Ummah from the scratch. Afghani, therefore, called for a fresh *Ijtihad* rather than making Islam fit to serve an alien system. His vision of Islam is a mixture of orthodoxy and modernism. Later this attitude found full expression in Iqbal's attempt at the Reconstruction of Islamic Thought. Afghani himself could not take up this project for the kind of hectic political activities, he was busy with, compelled him to keep away from the academic debates on the topic. One of the reasons for this may be that the process of *Ijtehad* which

Afghani had visualized and for which he recommended a democratic methodology was in no way practical in an age marked with political upheavals and intellectual confusions.[23] Afghani knew that he was fighting a lost battle, his success demanded no less than putting the entire world upside down. On the other hand Sir Syed had changed the very definition of success, he had successfully convinced people that what they considered defeat was no less than a victory, a valued opportunity of being a British subject. The psychological utopia that Sir Syed had created — based on his own interpretation of Islam — gathered around him a host of intellectuals. But very soon people realized that this illusion of success comes at the cost of self-respect and was based on an interpretation of Islamic history alien to the Muslim mind. In utter disillusionment and disgust, two close associates of Sir Syed, Hali and Shibli, broke away from the nationalist Islam and came to champion the Pan-Islamic cause.

Shibli was highly influenced by Sir Syed's neo-rationalism nevertheless traditionalism was the tool of his thinking. The reconstruction of Islamic thought according to him was very much possible within the parameters of traditional Muslim *Kalam* which he considered equivalent to modern day rationalism. He argued that if the Kalami debate had successfully helped Islam from 10th to 13th century there was no reason that the same cannot be put to use even today if we agree that the authenticity or correctness of a thought process does not alter with the passage of time. If the *Kalami* debates developed during the Abbasi period were effective to counter the Greek philosophy, there is no valid reason to believe that now it has lost that potential to absorb or counter the modern day free thinking.[24] The rationalist movement of the Abbasi

period that was ruthlessly crushed by Al-Mutawakkil (847-61) was, according to Shibli, in fact, one of the gifts of *Kalam* to Muslim civilization. Although it is a different story, he argues, that this movement was short lived and did not alter the Muslim thinking altogether due to its limited area of influence; the intellectuals and the royal court.[25] But despite his strong liking for rationalism and his attempt to present himself as the new interpreter of Islam Shibli comes to the same destination in his intellectual journey wherefrom Ghazali has begun his voyage. Probably, it is mainly because Shibli regards Ghazali as a bridge between orthodoxy and modernism. In him Shibli sees a person quite akin to his own image; attempting to capture the essence of modernism yet not giving away traditionalism altogether. Shibli's journey then ends up at the same point where it began. If his writings had any positive impact it lay in their successful revival of the Muslim past, if not as a strategy, at least, as a history. The idea of a majestic past enhanced the view that even today if Islamic Thought returns to its pristine purity and an intellectual return to the days of the Prophet is made possible, the past glory can still shine again. But how to make this journey backward in history and how to reconstruct the broken framework of Islamic Thought these questions were left unanswered.

The new, deformed Islamic thinking which by the beginning of the twentieth century had developed into a full-fledged school of thought, had based itself on a mixture of rationalism and orthodoxy. Sir Syed was a *Mo'tazela* only in religious matters but as far the political issues of his time, he was an *Asha'rite* per se. The British government, in his opinion, was a 'divine decree', which Muslims must obey, taking it as it were, the need of the hour and so a religious obligation.[26]

There is no denying the fact that this new political vision of Islam was not based on a certain variety of *Kalam* or on any definitive interpretation of Islam rather its only source was what the proponents of the new ideology claimed, 'the need of the hour'. With all respect due to the ideology of Islam and the love of the Prophet, it argued, Islamic faith is okay but when the Ummah is faced with a ruthless system, the Muslim must avoid a head-on collision, and limit himself to the practice of that part of Islam only that may ensure a peaceful coexistence. This new brand of Islam which owes its development to the modernists, the apologists and the nationalists of various hue, and which by the beginning of twentieth century had come to be regarded as the only viable variety of Islam can better be summarized as under:

(i) That the social life of Islam is still possible without an Islamic state as no where in the Quran the term *darul-Islam* has been mentioned. As for a non-Islamic government that does not stop Muslims from observing their religious rites, Muslims are not allowed to wage *Jihad* against it.[27]

(ii) That Muslims are allowed to take up the citizenship of a non-Muslim State and give their allegiance to a non-Muslim ruler, and that there is no harm in obeying his commands or even praying for the ruler's stability and development.[28]

(iii) That Islam, like other religions, is a private affair of the individual and it can easily be practised under any system given the right to freedom of religion.[29]

(iv) That the Quran does not mention any specific social system leaving it entirely to the people to devise a political system suitable to their age, therefore Muslims are free to reorganize their social and political life as per

the demands of the time,[30] and that the religious and the mundane are never mixed in Islam, nor there has ever been the unity of Church and State.[31]

(v) That education alone can ensure the revival of our majestic past for in our history knowledge alone has contributed to our glory.[32] Solutions to all the problems, therefore, do not lie in the political struggle but in the spread of education alone.[33]

(vi) That the traditional Islamic thinking has lost its vigor and relevance and the need of the hour is to adjust the Islamic ideals to the modern setting, a compromise formula being the logical imperetive.[34]

(vii) That Islam is basically, what can rightly be termed as 'ethnical humanism', which bestows on its adherents mutual love, brotherhood and physical and intellectual purity.[35]

This new school of Islamic thought, probably for the first time, put forward a version of Islam which debarred it from the socio-political life. This definition forced Islam to stay in exile, outside the state boundaries. The idea of religious freedom was limited to the performance of some religious rites and modes of worship. This new Islam had not only learned to survive and flourish without a state, more so, Muslims were now encouraged to work for the stability and development of a non-Islamic system. It had a great appeal for the people for its pragmatic overtones. Those who had accepted this version of Islam or who had themselves been instrumental in the creation of this school were marked by a duality in their words and deeds. Intellectually they thought of themselves as upholders of an ethical system but in practice they felt free to ignore the ethical implications altogether. They had come to believe that Islam is no more relevant in the

complexities of modern world. What most Muslims can do in this age is to re-candle or revive their religious lives by the ethical principles of Islam. The modern Indian interpreters of Islam, be they Chiragh Ali, Amir Ali, Khuda Baksh or Abdullah Yusuf Ali, all of them were basically the employees of a non-Islamic system. In principle they believed and proclaimed high ideals of Islam but in the practical sphere, what they were implementing, as executive apparatus of the new system, had nothing to do with the lofty ideals that these authors used to glorify in their writings. Those who were the paid agents of a non-Islamic system, appointed to serve a system other than Islam, their idea of Islam cannot give them anything other than physical and mental 'purity'. Whether these people could attain physical and mental purity is disputable, however the spread of this understanding reduced the all-embracing revolutionary Islam into a set of lifeless and meaningless rituals.

Once the Islamic thought got adulterated and a new version of Islam became known to people, it provided an open opportunity for every Dick and Harry to seek a redefinition of Islam. Anyone who read a few books on Islam considered himself qualified enough to write on modern Islam. Some of these authors recommended European life-style and the European dress for the uplift of the Muslim community,[36] while others made us believe that it was futile to look for Islamic guidance in matters of social importance as, in their opinion, Islam was compatible to all situations and can be adjusted to the modern times without much difficulty.[37]

Nonetheless, they were not the only interpreters of Islam. The age had witnessed a plethora of literature on new Islam mainly written by western educated Muslims. Each tract or booklet in itself reads like a manifesto of modern Islam,

claiming to be the only true version of Islamic understanding. However, what is common among them all is their feeling that they are basically doing a great job, that of a *mujaddid*, customizing Islam to the tunes of modern times. They might not be aware of the implications of revelation in modern times, however they confidently put forward their assumption as a well founded reality that traditional Islam was unable to cope with the new situation. As they themselves propounded the 'irrelevance' theory, for them the only way of serving Islam was to defend it in the face of other ideologies. The Islamic literature produced between the fall of Delhi till this time bears this illusion of defense. Islam which once used to instil in the believer the power of faith and action now came to be regarded as a shaky *Aqeeda*, employing its own followers to its defense which in itself is the theology of defeat. Those who take up to defend an idea, or a religion for that matter, have somewhere in their minds that if the idea is not presented in the most modern and acceptable way its very survival might be at stake. The defensive, rather apologetic approach turned the revolutionary massage of Islam into a mere dogma; a set of outdated values needing defense. This approach had a devastating impact on the future of Islamic thought. Islam once considered the engineering for change, a methodology to transcend the agonizing present into a better future now came to be regarded as a methodology for surviving an unending agony.

To have a better understanding of this religious digression, rather conversion of Muslim Indians to secularism, we must bear in mind that no age can boast of a single thought pattern as representative of its time howsoever dominant it might appear to be. For various divergent, sometimes opposing views, flourish in the same age though some may not be that

popular as to be taken as true representative voice of the period. Therefore it would not be fair to think that the age we are talking about had survived only on this version of Islam. The importance of Waliullhai School, though constantly losing its prestige and importance, cannot be undermined. True, the Waliullahi School was at a very low ebb at that time. It therefore posed no serious threat to this new modernist school of Islamic thought but the fact was that within the modernists themselves there were rebels or desperate souls always looking for a better alternative. The sudden emergence of the *Khilafat Movement* in 1919 as a populist mass movement can better be understood in this perspective only. The revolutionary energy generated by the populist storm of the *Khilafat Movement* was of such a great magnitude that at times it appeared as if Sir Syed School had finally been thrown into the dust-bin of history. But soon the excitement subsided and people felt that pan-Islamic slogans have taken them nowhere. One of the reasons for this disillusionment was, in my opinion, while Sir Syed School was well-founded on the supposed new understanding of Islam and had developed into a full fledged religion holding promise of leading the *Ummah* into a new era, the Waliullahi School was still unwilling to take up any modernization project. It had completely shut off from the modern world, placing too much emphasis on the protection of Muslim society through *Taqlid Jamid*. The reconstruction was not the agenda of the Waliullahi school or those who came to champion the cause of the *Khilafah*. The leaders of the *Khilafat Movement* were not probably aware of the need to reconstruct the Islamic thought rather in their desperation they wanted to keep intact somehow the ever-declining political structure. And as this 'somehow' was not very clear to them, despite their unceasing struggle, they

failed to uphold the old system or create a new dawn. The failure of the *Khilafat Movement* does not lie in the sudden political upturn in Turkey, as it is generally believed rather it should be traced in the absence of a clear-cut, well-defined framework of thinking. India is yet to produce a desperate genius like Mohammad Ali, a man whose courage, sincerity and love for Islam knew no bounds. But if even such a great soul ended-up in disillusionment, it was because he failed to understand that any revival of the *Ummah* must be along the right *manhaj*, purging the un-Islamic elements that have cropped up in our thinking. The leaders of the movement were mainly concerned with the survival of ever-declining symbolic *Khilafah* State. They were least bothered about the basic questions as what were the factors causing this decline. What really ailed the Ottomon *Khalifah* and what malaise lay at the root of it? Without taking up these questions it was not possible to formulate a methodology for revival. Had these questions been taken up seriously it would have resulted into the creation of a new school of Islamic thought, a timely and viable response to the new situation. Although the *Ulema* of Waliullahi School were convinced of the need for a new Islamic thinking partly owing to Waliullah's own teachings and partly due to the influence of Al-Afghani, they were afraid of opening the door of *Ijtihad* fearing that the modernists Muslims might take advantage of the situation. The so-called *Ijtihad* or fresh understanding as the champions of the new Islam called it, had produced a number of modern interpreters of various hue, adding yet more confusion. The traditional *Ulema*, refusing to legitimize this frésh-thinking, found no option left to them but to negate or reject the very notion of *Ijtihad* itself.

The eventual failure of the *Khilafat Movement* and the

refusal of the traditional *Ulema* to open the door of *Ijtihad* created a great vacuum that was to be filled by the scholars of a modernist hue. The deformed Islamic thought of the modernist variety found a congenial atmosphere to flourish. The failure of the *Khilafat Movement* was taken as the death of the traditionalism itself. Sir Syed's pragmatism now held sway as the only viable alternative. If Abul Kalam Azad who envisioned Hizbullah as early as in 1912 but was not sure of its success at that time, and who, during the *Khilafat Movement* had acquired some degree of confidence and optimism, turned his back it was because of the eventual victory of pragmatism over romanticism. Later not Azad alone became a prisoner of pragmatism but the poet Iqbal, known for his romantic Islamic vision, also came under its sway, a point we will later return to.

If we don't find in the post-*Khilafah* Muslim political thought any serious discussion on the *Khilafah* issue, it was not merely because of the failure of the *Khilafat Movement* or the impact of the modernist school of Sir Syed but more so because of the digression of Muslim political thought during the Mughal period where for almost 300 years or so there is no evidence of *Khilafah* as an institution so central to Islamic thought and *Aqeeda*. During the Mughal period Muslim India produced at least two *Ulema* of international repute whose impact is overwhelming on the Indian Muslim mind, they are; Mujaddid Alf Thani and Shah Waliullah. Despite the great revivalist movement to their credit and their insight into the Islamic mission, neither in Mujaddid Alf thani nor in Shah Waliullah one finds any serious attempt to reestablish the *Khilafah* along its original *manhaj* (base). To the contrary, ignoring the vital issue of *Khilafah*, Mujaddid Alf thani introduced a new concept which he termed as *Batini Khilafah*.

The same is true of Shah Waliullah, who, instead of calling for the establishment of the *Khilafah* reinforced the same alien concept of *Batini Khilafah* just to fill the void.[38]

The *Khilafah Movement*, that kept shaking the subcontinent for almost five years, was, in a way, a kind of ideological melting-pot where divergent and conflicting thought patterns had converged. Muslims from the Congress as well as from the League, the traditionalists and the modernists, all gathered at one platform. Probably for the first time history witnessed a scene to the effect that for a purely Islamic agenda not only the Muslims forgot their differences but the non-Muslim majority too lent its support. It was a unique experience in Islamic history when the non-Muslims were not only openly invited to participate in an Islamic struggle, even they were welcomed to deliver their political sermons right inside the mosques. The non-Muslim participation in the struggle became so central to it that Maulana Mohammad Ali while delivering his famous speech in London in 1920 openly declared thus:

> We are being led by a man who believes in soul-force. If throughout the world today there is anyone who tries to live up to the Sermon of the Mount — that sermon which is often overrated but at the same time always forgotten in the shaping of your foreign policy — if any man tries to live up to that sermon it is Mahatma Gandhi. He is not a Muslim. He is a Hindu of Hindus...[39]

For the first time in Muslim history a non-Muslim had assumed the leadership role in a struggle so central and crucial to Islam. The London speech of Mohammad Ali, a remarkable piece of oratory and sincerity declares that the non-Muslim control of Islamic mainland is intolerable. Mohammad Ali argues that Prophet Mohammad on his

deathbed had given us this injunction, binding on us all, that non-Muslims should never be allowed to take control of the Islamic mainland.[40] But it was quite paradoxical to see that the very movement to save the Islamic lands from non-Muslim control had come in the control of a non-Muslim leader. It was a devastating digression in the intellectual history of Islam that had a far-reaching impact on the Muslim mind. Although Mohammad Ali didn't take long to realize the magnitude of his blunder and the difference of Gandhian agenda from that of his own, the mistake once committed set a precedent for later day diversions. The 'believer' in the soul force soon turned into, in Mohammad Ali's own words, much inferior to a drunkard and a rapist Muslim. But this was only an individual correction. Later, taking a cue from Mohammad Ali's earlier stance, Abul Kalam Azad formulated a full-fledged Islamic theology for a Hindu-Muslim joint venture.

By this time, the idea that Muslims are an international Ummah had vanished from the Muslim mind. Some alien concepts, originally introduced by Sir Syed, which had failed to get a general acceptance at that time resurfaced as modern ideologies apparently in tune with Islam. For example, the idea of 'composite nationalism' that did not get acceptance on religious grounds in Sir Syed's time, came to be regarded in the new Muslim thinking as the only viable alternative. Similarly, the fear of non-Muslim majority, which Sir Syed basically nurtured in the Muslim mind for inculcating an unfailing loyalty to the British, that fear now fully developed into an ideology. Sir Syed had supported and popularized the legitimacy of non-Muslim rulers. Now, the *Khilafat Movement*, going a step ahead, had placed a non-Muslim leadership at the very helm of Islamic political struggle. The

Muslim mind had now no reservation in entrusting the leadership role to non-Muslims. The emergence of Muslim League for the protection of Muslim rights, the debate of separate electorate and the fear psychosis that had gripped the entire Muslim Ummah by the early twentieth century convinced them that in the present situation the sum total of their agenda could be to protect themselves as Indian Muslim nationals.

THE IMPACT OF ALIEN IDEOLOGIES

We must not lose sight of the fact that among those nourished on the Islamic thought during the entire era of decline, a predominant number of scholars were trained and educated in the West. As compared to the traditional *Ulema* of Waliullahi School the West-trained scholars of Islam have gained more prestige and prominence owing to their ability to write on Islam in English and in contemporary idiom. The popularity of Iqbal as a true voice of Islam despite his Western education has further strengthened the case of the modernists. It was generally believed that due to their exposure to the modern world the West-trained scholars were better qualified to lead the Ummah. Mohammad Ali's central importance in the *Khilafat* struggle can be understood in this perspective. The new interpreters of Islam had assumed so much authenticity and prominence that when Mohammad Iqbal attacked Maulana Hussain Ahmed Madani, the towering personality of the Waliullahi school, for the latter's faulty understanding of Muslim nationalism, the Maulana found no way but to retreat. The point that I am trying to make here is that the new interpreters were so much at the center stage of Islamic thought that the Muslims were approaching them for guidance and leadership. However, in the glare of their

popularity, the fact was missed that these scholars, knowingly or unknowingly, in the process of their exposure to western thought and philosophy had come under the spell of some Western concepts of which even they themselves were not aware nor were those followers who had full faith in their vision of Islam. Be they Amir Ali or Iqbal, they were known as vehement critics of the West, therefore people were not inclined to think that those who can openly and confidently criticize the West, could still not have their minds free of the Western influences.

I believe the Western concept that had a most devastating impact on the Muslim mind of that period was the nineteenth century theory of evolution imported from the West which later revolutionized the very methodology of Islamic interpretation. Both in Chiragh Ali and Amir Ali this concept has a negative impact while in Iqbal it takes a creative form. In the West Darwin's theory of evolution provoked divergent responses. Bergson, William Mc Dougall, Llyod Morgan and J.C. Smuts all differed in their understanding of this idea. The religious implication of the theory of evolution is not our concern here at this moment nor I want to indulge in the Western religious response of the period or to explain how the religious thinkers of the time responded to this great intellectual challenge. Here I want to limit myself only to the question as to what extent this idea had influenced the worldview of the Indian interpreters of Islam. We notice that in Chiragh Ali, under the spell of this idea, Islam became no more than 'the gradual evolution of spiritual ideas' which he believed was marching towards a better system.[42] And this led Amir Ali to conclude that some of the Islamic precepts were workable only for the prophet's own time: 'to suppose, therefore, that every Islamic precept is necessarily immutable

is to do an injustice to history and to the development of human intellect',[43] he argued.

Once the evolution was accepted as the only truth, it revolutionized the Muslim worldview. If the human mind and the human society were evolving towards a better social system, its logical implication was not only a reinterpretation of religious thought but also a new ground to suit the new ethical system. This would naturally lead to another question: what can be the right method for determining the parameters of new ethics and spirituality? The evolution as understood by Darwin and as interpreted or understood by Western educated Muslims was a concept very much in vogue. Amir Ali was one of its victims who had come to believe that not only the spiritual ideals of Islam were in the process of gradual evolution[44] but even some essential ingredient of Islamic practice like fasting was a useful discipline, especially 'among coarser natures, for whom really it was intended'.[45] Like other intellectuals of his time Amir Ali also believed that the human society is evolving towards a higher goal and that the coming days will witness the emergence of a better and higher spiritual ideals to meet the spiritual requirements of the time. The spirit of Islam, as he calls it, is basically intended to 'infuse or revive in the heart of humanity a living perception of truth in the common relations of life'.[46]

The theory of evolution had cast such a spell that even the traditionalists were not totally free from its influence. Shibli Nomani saw a semblance of Darwinian evolution in the Sufi poet Jalaluddin Rumi. This discovery made him feel at home with a concept so alien to and devastating for the Muslim mind. Later Iqbal tried to link it with Bergsonian *évolution créatrice*.[47] In Amir Ali the Darwinian evolution helped create a sort of liberalism while Iqbal, under its spell, came to believe

that in the modern world new institutions of Islam can be created 'thoroughly consistent with the spirit of Islam', rather he emphasized, it has 'become a necessity in view of the new forces that are set-free in the world of Islam'.[48]

As mentioned earlier, the idea of evolution is a positive factor and a creative force in Iqbal. He does not regard the universe as a static object or a finished product.[49] His view of the universe is that of a continuous creativity, an unending growth and development based on his understanding of some of the verses of the Quran e.g. 'He adds to Creation as He pleases'(*Fatir*:1) and 'So will Allah produce a later creation: for Allah has power over all things'(*Al-Ankabut*:20).

Iqbal is also of the opinion that the prophetic mission of establishing a global system of justice is yet too be realized and even 'the so called Golden Age of Islam was not ideal in the fullest sense of the term as an ideal by its very definition was not to be realized historically nor even in the future'.[52] His vision of the future Islamic mission is that of the creation of a global system of peace and justice based on *Tawhidi* ideals; 'The light of Oneness is yet to shine in full', as he aptly puts it in an Urdu verse:

"نورِ توحید کا اتمام ابھی باقی ہے"

The idea of an unfinished Prophetic agenda which Muslims are obliged to fulfil is also based on the traditions of the Prophet in which we are told of the global Islamic Khilafah as the eventual goal of human society on this earth. Iqbal appears to be exceptionally clear in his vision of the Islamic mission and is rightly aware of its various stages that the mission will undergo before it achieves its objective. But the mode of the journey, or the creation of new institutions for that matter, that Iqbal recommends for this mission

unfortunately have their roots in western civilization. Islam has its own institutions that have developed within a *Tawhidi* paradigm which cannot be replaced or substituted by the organizational models created in a *Taqwa*-free society of the West. Though Iqbal is well aware of the fact that the Ummah of the *Hashmite* Prophet is unique in its structure and nature, he fails to understand that the imported organizational pattern or political and social models cannot work within the Islamic framework. The two are simply incompatible. For example the institution of *Uolul-Amr*, so central and essential to Islam, takes a new shape in Iqbal under the influence of liberal democratic ideals of the West: 'the republican form of the government is not only thoroughly consistent with the spirit of Islam, but has also become a necessity in view of the new forces that are set-free in the world of Islam'.[53] Now the authority of the new Khalifah is not to be invested in one single person but in an elected assembly simply because the Islamic idea of single Khalifah appears to him impractical: 'The universal leadership of the Ummah has failed in practice. It was a workable idea when the empire of Islam was intact ... the idea has ceased to be operative and cannot work as living factor in the organization of modern Islam'.[54] The federation-making-approach appeared to him the only practical method in which he saw 'the birth of an international ideal' forming 'the very essence of Islam'. How intense was the pressure of alien social models on his mind can be seen in the following passage:

> It seems to me that God is slowly bringing home to us the truth that Islam is neither nationalism nor imperialism but a League of Nations which recognizes artificial boundaries and racial distinctions for facility of reference only, and not for restricting the social horizon of its members.[55]

Words like 'God is slowly bringing home to us' bear a prophetic rather than a visionary note. Instead of basing his arguments on the *Quran* and *Sunnah*, Iqbal assumes the role of a modern-day prophet in giving a new interpretation to what he terms as the 'modern Islam'. The new revelation, of which Iqbal is talking about, is an addendum to the original Islam, a strange way of welcoming western models to the body politic of Islam.

Iqbal's utterances cannot be ignored, as he is the most towering figure of the 20th century Islam. He is a vehement critic of the West as well as a champion of Islam. He has had a better exposure of the modern world but at the same time feels rooted in Islamic traditionalism. More so he calls for the reconstruction of Islamic thought. *Ijtehad* is his methodology and the pan-Islamism very nucleus of his intellectual framework. He wants to see Islam as a living reality, and not as a mere wonderful ideology or set of ethics:

> The religious order of Islam is organically related to the social order which it has created. The rejection of the one will eventually involve the rejection of the other. Therefore the construction of a polity on Indian national lines, if it means the displacement of the Islamic principles of solidarity, is simply unthinkable to a Muslim.[56]

However his rejection of pan-Islamic model leads him into a blind ally. Indian nationalism is not acceptable to him but his failure to discover an alternative Islamic model leaves no choice for him but to accept the idea of Muslim nation states as the only viable solution to the problems of the Muslims of the subcontinent. One simply wonders that the economic model that Iqbal recommends for this new Muslim nation state is not Islam but the socialist democracy,[57] an illusion which has been taking the Pakistani Ummah on a

ride for the last 50 years.

Nationalism is not in tune with Islam but the gradual acceptance of Muslim nationalism enabled its entry into the mainstream Islamic thought. Iqbal, who in his poetry appears to be a champion of pan-Islamism, eventually compromises on Muslim multi-nationalism when it comes to finding a workable solution, thereby paving the way for a modern Muslim nation state. He is very clearheaded about the fact that the basis of Islamic unity cannot be anything other than Islam itself and that the world is basically divided between the Ummah of Islam and the Ummah of Kufr.[50] Muslims may not appear to be true to the Islamic ideals and they might neglect the Prophetic mission nevertheless they very much have the potential to be the best of nations, a logical corollary of being the upholders of the last Prophetic mission.[59] But despite the clarity of thought in Iqbal, unlike Mohammad Ali's pan-Islamic vision, Iqbal's Muslim nationalism limits itself within the geographical boundaries of the subcontinent. Now the creation of the new Muslim state was not for the revival of the global Ummah of Islam alone but more so for 'security and peace resulting from an internal balance of power' and for a Muslim state of regional importance which may provide Islam an opportunity 'to rid itself of the stamp that Arabian imperialism was forced to give it, to mobilize its law, its education, its culture and to bring them into closer contact with its original spirit and with spirit of modern times'.[60]

The creation of a Muslim nation-state had no precedent in Islamic history. Muslims had seen the Muslim Spain flourishing independently, away from the central Khilafah, but it had always been regarded a digression from the mainstream Islam. Islam neither believes in composite

nationalism, a theory propounded and advocated by Azad and his associates and based on a faulty understanding of the Medina treaty, nor it sanctions the idea of a two-nation-theory which justifies the creation of a Muslim nation state. Nationalism, be it Indian or of the Pakistani variety, is equally unacceptable to Islam. Later the Pakistani nationalism which was taken as an equivalent to Islam itself became instrumental in creating intellectual confusion in Pakistan. Islam and Pakistani nationalism became so interchangeable terms that when Syed Abul Ala Maudoodi, a celebrated Islamic thinker of Pakistan, uttered these words on his death bed: "I am a Muslim Pakistani", few were able to realize that these words were directly opposed to the vision of the global Ummah of Islam.

In our analysis of Islamic thought I have discussed Iqbal at length because of his central importance among the twentieth century Muslim thinkers. If Mohammad Ali has the credit of leading the largest mass movement of this century, Iqbal appears to be the leading light of the intellectual movement of his time. Though at that time the prestigious organization of Muslim *Ulema* was quite active and the popular figures like Azad and Madani held the key, nonetheless, Iqbal had emerged as the sole representative of Islamic thought. Probably for the first time in India the religious position of a philosopher-poet became supreme and authentic as compared to that of the traditional *Ulema*. It may be because, I believe, despite his high-pitched slogans for *Ijtihad*, Iqbal remained, throughout his life, a staunch believer in traditionalism. He regards himself as a continuum of Afghani and Rumi and implies a purely traditional methodology in the interpretation of modern Islam.

The entire intellectual history of this period including

Iqbal appears to be a desperate attempt to look for an intellectual Islamic framework in tune with the modern times. The declining nation, in search of an intellectual alternative, naturally has a price to pay. Despite their sincere attempt to uphold their social and spiritual ideals they cannot completely stay away from alien influences as for those desperately looking for the lost glory there is always a possibility to land in an alien ideological plain taking it for a newly developed shape of their own traditional thought.

The post-independence intellectual landscape is marked by utter confusion. We find the Muslim intellectuals of this time talking of alien concepts as their own. Concepts like composite nationalism, Muslim nation state, democracy, secularism and nonviolence etc. have gained a common currency. Democracy which apologists like Amir Ali had considered a unique gift of Islam to humanity now attained a key role in Iqbal who considered a democratically elected assembly or parliament essential for a consensus on *Ijtihadi* issues. So is secularism, the very foundation of socio-political life both in Jinnah and Azad despite their diametrically opposite political stands. In this confused scenario it is not so surprising then if one finds two prominent *Ulema* of Deoband school namely Maulana Obaidullah Sindhi[63] and Hifzur Rahman Seoharvi,[64] busy in the formulation of an Islamic version of socialism what they termed as Waliullahi socialism. And few would believe that Maulana Mahmudul Hassan, the most towering figure of his time, had come to believe that Gandhian nonviolence was yet another form of Islamic *Jihad*.

Precisely this was the intellectual scenario before partition. Apparently the Indian Muslims were divided into two opposite camps. The caravan led by Azad and Madani, the champions of composite nationalism, was certainly not set

for establishing an Islamic order as we were told by Maulana Madani himself.[66] The second caravan led by Jinnah, but basically inspired by Iqbal's thought, claimed an Islamic state as its eventual destination. However, both the upholders of composite nationalism and that of the two-nation theory were so unclear in their intellectual goals, so completely in the grip of alien ideologies that in this intellectual haze it was difficult for them to proceed towards any direction. It was this confusion which echoes in Jinnah's presidential address to the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan on 11 August 1947:

> ... we will find that in the course of time Hindus would cease to be Hindus and Muslims will cease to be Muslims; not in the religious sense because that is the faith of each individual, but in the political sense as citizens of the state.[67]

Jinnah's utterances are no different from the views of Azad and Madani who had long been claiming that in India Hindus and Muslims together make a nation though not a *millah*. The tragedy that befell this caravan in Pakistan is not within the scope of this paper. Here we will limit our discussion only to the intellectual journey of the first caravan, and in the process, would like to know as to what extent the intellectual heritage of Azad and Madani helped the Indian Muslims in the reorganization of their *milli* life. We will also investigate whether composite nationalism remained relevant in post-independent India or it became an obstacle in their search for another alternative. In our investigation of post-independence Muslim thought Iqbal and his revivalist school will have to be mentioned off and on, for no intellectual legacy can be limited to geographical boundaries nor can they be forced to take an exile.

POST-'47 INDIA: THE EMERGENCE OF A NEW WORLD

The partition of India did not divide territories alone. It also divided 90 million Muslims of India into two, rather in three geographical blocks; East Pakistan, West Pakistan and the secular India. The geographical division of Ummah resulted in further disintegration of its already shaken intellectual legacy. True, before partition Muslims were clearly divided into two distinct blocks of composite nationalism and Muslim nationalism but despite their distinct intellectual identities they had a feeling that at times the two distinct streams overlap. Despite being in two distinct camps at times they felt an affinity to each other; for both Iqbal and Azad, in their own way were working for the eventual supremacy of Islam. The geographical division of the country placed them psychologically in two watertight compartments. Now the interest of Pakistani Muslims was opposed to the interest of Indian Muslims.[68] The independence brought a situation in which Indian Muslims found themselves in a New World, in an alien system for which they were not intellectually and emotionally prepared.

According to 1941 Census Muslims constituted a population of 94.4 million.[69] After partition their numerical strength was reduced to 40 million.[70] The 40 million strong population, now termed as a minority, was totally at the mercy of the new alien system and in the care of the Congressite *Ulema* led by Azad. Azad himself never accepted the view that Muslims formed a minority nor he ever used this term for the Muslim Ummah. But now in the Constituent Assembly debates he was forced to hear this term for the Muslim community. For all practical purposes Muslims were not at the center stage any more. The fact was that their conversion from a revolutionary Ummah into a hapless minority was

total. This new identity had a far-reaching impact in shaping Muslim attitude towards life in the new situation. Their view of the future was influenced by this false identity and in all their planning they knowingly or unknowingly regarded themselves a minority. The phenomenon itself was not new though. The same fear had produced in the beginning of the twentieth century an organization like the Muslim League thereby causing the dismissal of Ummah from the leadership role. Ambedkar's opinion that the delay in discovering the philosophical justification for Pakistan was 'due to the fact that Muslim leaders had become habituated to speaking of Muslims as a community and as a minority", holds an iota of truth. The use of this terminology', Ambedkar has rightly pointed out, 'took them in a false direction and brought them to a dead end'.[70] And as they acknowledged themselves as a minority and shaped their mental outlook accordingly, they felt that there was no other course left for them but to ask for safeguarding of their constitutional rights and protection of their life and limb. Now in free India where Muslims' numerical strength was reduced to a half, the fear psychosis and the feeling of 'minorityness' gripped them more than ever before.

It is the mental outlook that shapes the history of nations. If a nation believes that its role in history is over and that at most what it can do is to protect itself, such a nation will easily be thrown into the dust-bin of history. Nations which have created history of their own, or have given the world a leadership or had the credit of turning the tide of history mainly comprised of those people who believed in their unconquerable will, in their extraordinary potential and in their unshakable belief that they, as compared to others, have a very special mission to fulfil. In human history if we find a

handful of Jews exceptionally active and influencing the events it is because of their strong faith that they are no ordinary people but the very chosen children of God. Hitler's belief in racial superiority of the German people and his strong faith that his is a race destined to conquer the entire world enabled him to take the entire Europe by storm. The extraordinary success of the British empire in the nineteenth century also owes much to the belief of the British people that they as the white race have a potential superiority over the Asians and the Africans, and that they are no ordinary people but the torch bearers of the new science and technology made to lead the civilized world. To enhance this belief and to justify it on so called scientific grounds they created a new branch of knowledge called Anthropology. In India if the Brahmin minority was able to dominate the Indian scene controlling the entire Hindu society for centuries it was mainly because of their mental upbringing that they as the white Hindus were entrusted to a leadership role. And if the *shudras*, the Black Hindus, have been content with the menial jobs and regard cleaning of the toilets as their religiously ordained duty it was also because of their false but unshakable belief that they, having been born from the feet of Brahma, have no other social assignment. Similarly, in the early era of Islam if a small band of Muslims emerging from the Arabian peninsula is seen defeating the Persian and Byzantine empires, the then super powers, it also owes to the mental makeup of the Muslim Ummah that they are the Ummah of the Last Prophet destined to rule the world till the day of judgement. As for the visible military superiority of the enemies, Muslims countered it with their strong belief that being a believer they not only deserve Allah's help but also, as per Islamic rule, one believer is equal to at least ten non believers, if not twenty. Be

it an individual or a nation its success and failure lies mainly in its ideological and mental makeup. In free India where a loose definition of the term Hindu has turned the Hindus into a majority, Muslim's belief in their 'minorityness' became order of the day. And as a minority, by its very definition, has no role to play at the center-stage, Muslims got themselves suspended from the leadership role. The term minority has played a key role in diverting Muslims from the Islamic agenda and in putting a seal on the emergence of any creative thinking among them.

Before we further proceed let us briefly summarize the main digressions in the Muslim political thought in free India. The free India, even to the exponents of composite nationalism, has come as a mirage; dismissing the Muslim nation from a leadership role, turning them into a hapless minority. Secondly, Muslims though sure of an un-Islamic future of free India were yet content to be a significant part of the new setup and were enthusiastic for its development and stability. Thirdly, they came to believe that despite the fact that non-Muslims would have an ultimate say in the system it was lawful for the Muslim to actively participate in it and with the non-Muslim help organize their own social life. Fourthly, the piety and spiritual quality in a Hindu leadership could equally qualify him for assuming the leadership of Muslims too. Fifthly, for Muslims serving the new system was not only an expression of patriotism but also very much a part of Islamic *aqeeda*, a religious obligation. These five points which were basically various facets of nationalist Islam attained dogmatic importance. They were taken as nationalistic expressions of Islamic thoughts or for that matter as expression of Islam in contemporary idioms. In 'free' India when Muslims found themselves in a new situation and their

intellectuals felt the need to formulate a new strategy these prevalent beliefs easily found their way in Muslim thinking, belittling any hope for the emergence of a fresh approach. To explain this point we will discuss the 1947 Lucknow convention at some length.

It goes without saying that in free India Azad and his proteges had a sole claim to the political and intellectual leadership of the Ummah. The Muslim League was no more relevant. Azad had probably pointed out to this sole monopoly on leadership when in his famous speech at the Jama Masjid he declared that now there was no place for the Muslim League in this country, especially in the changed situation. However he failed to realize the irrelevance of his own political philosophy which was basically formulated in view of a united India. But few were left to challenge his intellectual supremacy or doubt his political wisdom. The new situation had placed him into prominence and he emerged as the only cognizable center for Muslim Indians. The Jama Masjid speech, as it later came to be called, had exhorted Muslims that they, instead of migrating to Pakistan, should formulate a suitable strategy to meet the challenges of the new situation. This fine piece of rhetoric, though otherwise a marvellous expression of optimism, had raised some hopes that in the new situation Azad would formulate a strategy much in tune with the past history, for the same speech had made mention of the Muslim conquerors of the past whose caravan, not long ago, had descended on the shores of the Yamuna.[72] The remembrance of the majestic past created a hope in a bright future. To announce a new work-plan for Indian Muslims Azad convened a Muslim convention on 26th December 1947. The resolutions adopted at this convention should rightly be termed as the new manifesto of Indian Muslims in free India.

Earlier, we have discussed at length the secret entry of the alien concepts into Muslim thought and their far-reaching devastating impact. The Lucknow convention was yet another expression of how alien concepts can stop the emergence of a true Islamic polity. The situation had changed but the political attitude of nationalist Muslims had not. In pre-partition India Muslim were psychologically free or at least had the illusion of intellectual freedom while formulating a strategy. But now in free India the state ideology had been interfering and the secular non-Muslim leadership had taken a direct control of the Muslim agenda. Gandhi himself was very much in the background of the Lucknow convention and had called on Maulana Hifzur Rehman and Ahmed Sayeed for making the event a success. The conference with so much non-Muslim interference could only be a forum for public announcement rather than an attempt to formulate any independent Muslim response to the situation.

The Lucknow convention gave no new message to the Ummah instead it re-emphasized the same old polity which, according to Azad, he had put forth before the Ummah some 40 years ago and the rejection of which had brought the Ummah to such a pass. The convention took two important decisions; firstly that Muslims should voluntarily dissolve all communal (milli) organizations and should stop talking of an independent Muslim polity or anything that might show up their communal or milli inspirations; secondly, hence onward the Muslims should wholeheartedly participate in non-communal political organizations and since in those days the Indian National Congress was the only organization of its kind the Muslims were urged to join it without any delay. The Lucknow convention, in effect, instead of creating any fresh thinking brought the Ummah to a dead end. The

announcements made at the Lucknow convention though could not stop communalism, nevertheless they shut on Muslims all doors of new potential opportunities. The *Jamiatul Ulema* which had taken the responsibility of leading the Ummah in the changed situation voluntarily and publicly purged its political aspirations and remained content in being a mere cultural organization and an appendage to the Congress. Soon the Jamiat leadership stopped talking of politics or taking up a political mode of protest to press their demands, limiting themselves to only cultural and 'religious' activities.[73]

No doubt there were other ideological groups among the Ummah which were keeping an eye on the situation but they were not that influential as the *Ulema* of the Jamiat or Muslims of the Congressite hue. Mention should also be made of Syed Abul Ala Maudoodi, known for his strong opposition to both composite nationalism and Muslim nationalism, who though himself had shifted to Pakistan, the remnants of his Jamat-e-Islami in India were nevertheless intellectually active in formulating a new strategy for the future which found public expression in Maulana Abul Lais Islahi's book *Musalmanan-e-Hind ke Liye Aainda ka Lahae Amal*, first published in 1957.[74] But at that time this voice was so weak that it could not attract many people. Though otherwise Islamically sound, this approach failed to generate a public debate. Those who were emotionally attached to religion but were not finding the new state ideology in tune with their Islamic aspirations failed to discover a real viable alternative in such religious writings which presented Islam only as an ideology and not as a methodology. The religious people therefore were looking for an alternative that instead of meddling with secularism and its political system can offer them enough room for

fulfilling their religious duties. The extraordinary growth of *Tablighi Jama'at* and a general attraction to its call in post independent India owes much to this fact.

Away from the state ideology of secular democracy a section of religious Muslims, instead of facing the new challenge, devised a methodology of leading an Islamic life right under a non-Islamic system. This became only possible by changing the very meaning of religion and by redefining the territory of religious interference. The upholders of this new *deen*, though otherwise known for their religious commitments, came to believe that it was not in tune with the time to expect from the Muslims a complete Islamic life with all its manifestations and practices, the *Shariah* in full. Instead, the exponents of this Islam openly declared:

> We call for the basic teachings of Islam and invite people only to understand and appreciate and feel the greatness of the *Kalima*: *La Ilaha Illallah Mohammadur Rasulullah*. As also refresh their faith by reciting this formula with great care, time and again. This formula is not an easy declaration but a weighty decision, an agreement encompassing the entire human life... We believe that if Muslims develop in themselves these four basic things they will not only be in a position to lead an Islamic life but for sure their life will become manifestations of pure Islam, and Muslims will be in a position to practise Islam in full.[75]

Such writings could not clear up the intellectual haze or define the Muslim agenda rather they strengthened the belief that away from the political system right under its nose there remains a possibility to lead an Islamic life. Such a concept of *Deen*, which had nothing to do with the socio-political system, was very much in tune with the new system and it had been constitutionally guaranteed to survive and flourish.

Any serious discussion of Muslim political thought cannot afford to ignore the secular nationalists who otherwise appear as mere appendage to Azad's school but who because of their purely secular outlook had acquired an independent identity too. The group comprising of Zakir Hussain, Muhammad Mujib and Abid Hussain represented a school in which nationalism and national culture were emphasized more than Islam itself. Unlike Azad, Mujib had no remorse for the disintegration of Islamic political structure, rather he regarded this situation as a unique opportunity which allowed an individual to understand and practise Islam in his own capacity without any pressure of Muslim society.[76] Abid Hussain looks at Indian Islam basically as a Vedic response to Islam in India and opines that Indo-Islamic civilization had suffered during the Mughal era because of Muslims' unwillingness to include Indian ethos in Islamic culture. Now, he argues, in free India if Muslims are ignored, a composite Indian nation will be difficult to evolve 'leading to apathy and stagnation, so that in the end they (Muslims) would become an economic and cultural dead weight hanging around India's neck'.[77] If Abid Hussain puts forward a purely secular agenda for India's cultural unity, Zakir Hussain, further advancing the same agenda argues that Muslims have a double standard on cultural issues, they are aggressive about the recognition and propagation of their own culture while they do not want to give the same right to the Hindus.[78] His notoriety in connection with the Wardha scheme and the shamefacedly apologetic posture that he took after taking oath of Presidency, especially the mentioning of the Ram Raj and seeking blessings from the Hindu priests had conveyed only one message; that Muslim Indians had no other option but to accept the majority culture thereby stop talking of their

Islamic aspirations.

Mention should also be made of A. A. A. Fyzee who had not come up with the promise of any new agenda for Muslim Indians but whose writings had created a furor in intellectual circles of his time. Fyzee's prominence also lies in his social position and in the fame of his writings on modern Islam. His sloganeering could attract the thinking Muslims of the time but the process of *Ijtihad* that he wanted to initiate could not be set in motion and despite his emotional involvement and commitment to *Ijtihad* he ended his journey where Iqbal had begun. Fyzee's failure also lies in his attempt to understand Islam within the Indo-Islamic cultural framework. If Islam has to survive and flourish in India, he argues, Muslims must find a meeting ground between Islam and local religions. Taking a cue from the Malikite premise that the essential message of the Quran 'will last longer than its language' and if one can witness a growth of Quranic understanding in old exegetical literature there is no reason why Quran cannot be interpreted afresh. But Fyzee adds to this new understanding a methodology of exegetical pluralism and holds the view that a fresh understanding of Quran must be based on a sympathetic understanding of Judaism, Christianity and Indian religons.[79] In support of his argument he quotes Jawaharlal Nehru who had come to believe that if any religion claims that 'the last word had been said society becomes static'. According to Fyzee, Islam as a dynamic force has ceased to exist. He feels that Islam at this stage is in need of a Luther and, if so happens, the gateway to *Ijtihad* can be opened and an individual interpretation of Islam will be very much possible.[80]

Fyzee sharply distinguishes between the term 'law' and 'religion'; the former being the *fiqhi* heritage and the latter the

individual's faith. In his attempt to create a Protestant Islam he advocates that Muslims instead of placing so much importance to the *Shariah* should accept Islam as a collection of ethics. This he believes would adjust Islam to the new situation paving the way for secular Laws. He is also of the view that if Islamic ethics can be separated from Islamic law the ideological confusion of Indian Muslims will come to an end and they will be in a better position to play a constructive role in the modern secular system. Fyzee, though emotionally attached to Islam, lacks the basic courage and guts required to meet the challenge and therefore feels content in being among those believers who 'thank God in times of prosperity, be patient in adversity and resign themselves to their fate'.[81]

Such and the like statements are truly representative of the intellectual confusion that is the hallmark of Muslim thought in post-independence India. Before independence Muslim thought, despite its obvious digressions, had not given up altogether the idea of revival of the majestic past. The past history was instrumental in shaping the present. At times the revivalist attitude might appear losing ground, as one witnesses in the political thought of Sir Syed, and, at times, developing with new vigor and enthusiasm into a full fledged movement, as one witnesses in the Khilafat struggle of Muhammad Ali, but the idea itself, of a possible revival of the past glory, was very much part of the Muslim thought. Muslims might not be fully aware of the global outlook of Islamic mission and the implications of the institution of Uoul-amr in their social life; nonetheless, there was no confusion to the effect that the Indian Muslims had a political agenda different from that of other communities of the country. But after the partition it seems as if the element of Muslim thought has completely gone out of Islam. Now the

issues of vital Islamic importance are discussed and defined not with reference to Islamic paradigm, instead new secular epistemologies have taken their place. The replacement of Islamic epistemologies with the secular ones implies a change of the very tool of thinking. Now the Muslim Indians feel baffled about their own identity, knowing not who they are and what role have they to play in this country. These and such basic questions were left unanswered. The Muslim intelligentsia too was totally confused about its potential future role and identity. Each Muslim leader wanted to give the Ummah a new identity and a new direction. Muslim's writings and speeches on the topic, about the possible future role of the Muslims, are not only marred by an identity crisis but also by a longing for and pangs of the creation of a new identity.

As stated earlier, the Lucknow convention was the beginning of the end of Islamic history in India where Muslims, for the first time in history voluntarily dissolved themselves as an ideological group, ejected Islam from the potential leadership role and decided to survive only as a cultural group. Islamic polity was declared irrelevant and Muslims were advised to take active part in secular politics. As to what kind of society were Muslims going to create in collaboration with the non-Muslims, the speakers at the Lucknow conclave were themselves not clear about it. But the situation demanded that they must find out a compromise formula between Islam and the alien system, no matter even if it is at the cost of Islamic agenda. Afraid of an uncertain future and unaware of the implications of the new secular epistemologies, Muslims found no other course left for them but to accept the new political reality or ideology and, at the same time, keep the flame of Islam alive by making it a personal agenda, the

individual creed. An in-depth analysis of the Lucknow convention leads us to conclude that Muslim politics that later openly divorced Islam from its concerns owes much to this event. Soon people realized that not only the political reality had changed but also the political concepts. The political concepts that have been popular among Muslim Indians in the later half of the twentieth century have in fact nothing to do with Islam, a point to which we will later return.

In the terminology that has been instrumental in taking the Muslim thought to wilderness was the popularly known concept of 'freedom' that was taken at its face value, without any *fiqhi* evaluation of the term. As we know Islam does not attach any importance to the nationality of the ruler. A ruler be he a local or a foreigner, Black or White, attains a legitimacy only when he has been given allegiance to rule over Muslims as a deputy of the Prophet. But the Muslim leaders of that time were so intoxicated with the idea of 'freedom' and so enthusiastic to serve their 'beloved India' that they completely missed the point that the new India had brought them from one alien rule to another. At times owing to the harsh ground realities and due to the ever increasing helplessness they came very close to conclude that what they were experiencing in the name of freedom was a political slavery of the worst kind. But the pressure of alien epistemologies, now the very tool of their thinking, stopped them from coming to this realization. The supposed freedom was taken as such for an ultimate truth and even thinking Muslims found it difficult to voice their doubts. They dared not question this independence lest they should be called anti-national. To understand this dilemma we lift an editorial piece from the prestigious Urdu magazine *Burhan* for our analysis:

However, a realist and an honest person has the right to ask; is this the same freedom that we wanted to achieve, is this the same beautiful goddess of independence for which the entire country was so desperate and is this the revival of the same glory for which, on the one hand Sirajuddaulah and Tipu gave away their lives and on the other hand Syed Ahmad Shaheed and his followers created a unique mixture of spirituality and chivalry — a scene that Balakot had never witnessed before. If this is the same Aazadi which was dreamed by Hazrat Shaikhul Hind, Ansari, Ajmal Khan, Muhammad Ali, Motilal Nehru and C.R. Dass then, why is it so that the country is receiving this gift of Aazadi in the form of chaos and disorder, constitutional tyranny and police rule.[82]

The author no doubt strongly voices his doubts about what he calls 'Aazadi'. His pessimism is quite obvious. It is not that dawn, he feels, for which he has been waiting for so long, however he lacks the courage to give this supposed Aazadi a true name, a sheer helplessness and political slavery of the worst kind that it is. The terminology that found way in the intellectual framework had become, due to its frequent use, the very tool of thinking process, and it was not easy to get rid of such concepts altogether. Probably it is because of this mental conditioning that on the very next page of the same editorial the author brings to us some good news:

No doubt the chains of slavery are breaking away. The freedom is dawning on us. But we must remember that the freedom in itself has no value unless it is implemented in its true spirit.[83]

Here is a clear attempt of luring into a false optimism. Muslims did not dare question the Islamic validity of such concepts. At most they could only say that the concept itself is not flawed but the way it is being implemented. Later,

whenever Muslims received a major blow from this ruthless oppressive system, they, instead of taking stock of the situation and coming to terms with the harsh realities, always made a fresh declaration of their faith in secularism saying that the secularism as a concept was okay but our grievances were only due to its wrong implementation.

Now any discussion of the Muslim agenda, or the formulation of a future strategy for that matter, had to base itself on the secular democratic ideals rather than the Quran and Sunnah. The idea that Muslims are a missionary group, religiously ordained to inviting people to good and forbidding them from the evil, was no longer uppermost in the Muslim mind. Instead, they based their agenda on the understanding of the new situation. A secular socialist democracy as India is, they were told, guarantees Muslims their minority rights and hence they must reshape their agenda in accordance with the new framework. In free India this kind of thinking was popular not among Muslims of a particular hue, the entire Ummah had accepted this approach as the only viable alternative. Even the Muslim idealists of the Jamat-e-Islami variety could not save themselves from this thinking.[84]

The new Muslim agenda had now its roots in the understanding of the new realities instead of basing itself in the *Shariah*. The *Shariah*, which has always been central to Muslim thought and which has always been employed by Muslims as a tool of understanding, had no such role to play in the new context. Now the situation itself was the touchstone, a reliable basis on which Muslims have to decide their future course of action. The formulation of a new Muslim agenda that may be in tune with the secular democratic system was only possible by the total ejection of *Shariah* from the Muslim thought. And as *Shariah* was no more the basis of decision

making and the Muslims had to decide their course of action on the basis of ground realities, they found a whole New World waiting for them:

> India is a democratic country. Muslims must respect it and take advantage of this situation. And this is only possible if they first undergo a process of self-realization proving themselves to be true Muslims in words and deeds. They must not lose sight of the fact that they, as a community, have been entrusted to serve this land and the people who inhabit it. Service is not done in isolation but through social relations and mutual cooperation. It is therefore imperative on Muslims that if the country is in need of honest and able administrators they must provide it. If it is in need of learned professionals, engineers, doctors, lawyers, artisans and social workers it is for us the Muslims to meet out these requirements. In short, we have to produce qualified people who may serve the nation with sincerity and honesty in every walk of life, be it government office or parliament, university or college, police or judiciary, agriculture or trade, craft or industry.[85]

'India is a democratic country' and this is the main assumption, the ground reality that forms the basis of the new Muslim agenda. On the one hand Muslims are told to be true to the Islamic faith, to be aware of the grand Islamic mission, on the other it is suggested that they as a community must put themselves at the service of an alien political system. This call for service to a nation state is a clear digression from the Islamic agenda. An open invitation to Muslims, such as this, to serve a non-Muslim state has no precedent in Islamic history. If Sir Syed had justified the service of the British Raj on the ground of material benefits which he considered as essential for Muslims in that age, this new invitation to

Muslims to come forward to serve a non-Islamic system justified itself on the so called religious grounds. This was such a clear case of intellectual and political apostasy that the subcontinent had never witnessed before anything like it.

MUSLIMS AND THE NEW STATE IDEOLOGY

The digression in Islamic thought and the extraordinary popularity of alien ideologies among Muslims also owe to the prevalent belief that secular ideologies are neutral in nature, like water without shape and color, and that they do not interfere in the Islamic belief system. In free India secularism and democracy gradually attained the status of a new dogma, the twin pillars of the new state religion. However both these terms were so alien to Muslim mind that Muslims have no equivalents for these concepts in their languages. Some people still believe that those who, instead of making India a Hindu state, decided to envision a secular India were the tolerant broad-minded folk. But a deeper analysis of the situation makes us believe otherwise. Secularism was the most suitable concept for a Hindu dominated polity and for a people who were unable to define what Hinduism is. The scriptures of Hinduism, so divergent, conflicting and at times contradictory in nature, had no idea at all as how to handle the complexities of modern social life. Not only a definition of the term Hinduism was impossible but it was also difficult for those who claim to be Hindus to agree on any specific version of this religion. At most, Hinduism was a sort of ethical humanism which instead of getting involved in collective social life urged the individuals to stay away from it. The only way to attain salvation, or *Mokshu* as they call it, was to get rid of the cycle of birth and rebirth and this was only possible when the individual completely shuns the material world

and elevates himself so high as to have no inkling of the mundane.

The adoption of secularism as a state religion was mainly due to three reasons; firstly the absence of the idea of a Hindudom and a well defined social life in Hindu religion, secondly Hinduism, as it is a private affair of the individual, needed for its survival to project religion as a mere cultural heritage, thirdly the Hindu faith and culture that were a collection of outdated customs and meaningless rites, were in need of a reformer for their continuance. The new state, which took up the reformation task, became in the process protector and propagator of Hindu ideals. The makers of new India took special care while formulating the constitution that in future through constitutional and judicial intervention a new, acceptable version of Hinduism may take shape. In principle the state maintained a distance from Hinduism but the very idea of secularism which appeared to be shapeless and transparent, was, in fact, much in tune with Hinduism, rather its modern version which alone held promise of keeping alive the Hindu ethos in the future.

Secularism, though otherwise a Western concept, was given a new meaning in the Indian context, making it compatible with the Indian or Hindu ethos. For years there was an ongoing debate as to what secularism means in the Indian context. Some understood it in the sense of religious tolerance while others regarded it as a mere separation of state from church. Yet others made us believe that it was not to be taken in a western sense where it was as a concept opposed to religion. Everybody had his own interpretation of secularism, nonetheless, there was some consensus among the theorists that though the word had no equivalent in Indian languages the closest Hindi equivalent of the term

could be *Dharm-Nirpekshta*. Secularism, as a concept opposed to religion, was not acceptable to the Muslims but its logical implication as a state ideology to the effect that there will not be a state religion and that the state will have an impartial attitude towards all religions gained general acceptance among them. However the very idea that the state will be made free from religious guidance was not acceptable in Islam. On the contrary in Hinduism the separation of state and church, the spiritual and the mundane was a well-established norm as the essence of Hindu religion lies in the renunciation of this world. The new state ideology of secularism that was ideologically a valid stance for the Hindus and other non-Muslims gradually gained currency among the Muslims also despite the fact that Islam regards itself incomplete without a political structure of its own. And despite the loud proclamation by the state that it was neutral on religious issues, the fact was that secularism, and more precisely the Indian variety of it, was yet another name for modern Hinduism. Muslims were slow to realize that the propagation of the new political ideology wrapped in secularism and the attempt to strengthen this secular system, of which they themselves became a part, was basically an attempt to establish a non-Islamic system leaving no room for any hope of future Islamic revival. As this call to political apostasy was employing popular jargon such as secularism and democracy, it, therefore, became difficult for even the Muslim *Ulema* and intellectuals to understand the real designs.

Muslims even in their worst days have always been conscious of the fact that their religion Islam is the only road to salvation. Despite their belief in the unity of religions, Muslims look at the other religions of the world as deformed and perverted version of the divine truth. They also believe

that the nations of other Prophets have been ejected from the leadership role and now it is the Muslim Ummah entrusted to lead the world till the Day of Judgement. On this supreme status assigned to the Muslim Ummah and this vision of Islamic mission there has never been any disagreement among Muslims. If Muslims have to enter into a dialogue with other religious communities it is possible only on these premises. But in new India where the state had taken a neutral stand towards all religions and like other religions it had also ejected Islam from socio-political life, Islam came to be regarded, like other local religions, as a charter of the private faith. Talking about the state ideology, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, one of the main ideologues of modern India, some three years before his death said in 1961 that the Indian secularism is not based on the opposition to any religion rather 'it is a state which honors all faiths equally and gives them equal opportunities'. The popularity of secularism as a concept that it respects all religions equally and the sense of religious pluralism and tolerance undermined the importance of Islamic mission in the Muslim mind. The Muslims too came to believe that Islam is just another religion, at par with other religions. Those who once happened to believe in the uniqueness of Islamic mission and in the finality of Islamic message now, under the spell of state propaganda that secular ideologies are compatible with Islam, came to believe that the secular apparatus guarantees the protection of Islamic faith much in the same way that it guarantees protection to other religions.

Initially secularism was projected as a shapeless, colorless, neutral ideology. Muslims were told that the state itself will have no religion and it will provide equal opportunities for all religions to flourish. But as the days went by and the

secular state started interfering in the religious life of people it became obvious that secularism in itself is a complete religion and its neutrality is a false metaphor. The secular state through its judicial apparatus took the task of reformation of Hindu religion making it clear that the religious life of the citizens is not spared from state intervention. Muslims who once believed in the totality of social and spiritual life, who regarded it a religious obligation to obey an Uolul-Amr from amongst them and who had no confusion to the effect that the Uolul-Amr, or the political authority, had to be a Muslim — authorized to rule over them only as a deputy of the Prophet — found no room for an Islamic social life within this secular system. On the surface the state had taken a neutral posture towards all religions but the very fact that state had de-recognized religion as a guiding light in matters of social and political importance was a devastating idea that implied for Muslims that they too, like other citizens of the country, have to agree to live a life away from Islam.

Having already stated that the idea to have secularism as the state ideology is very much in tune with the Hindu worldview, we must not lose sight of the fact that Hinduism as a religion has nothing to do with the affairs of the state. The modern thinkers of Hinduism found refuge in saying that it is no religion as such but a way of life, a cultural legacy. Even a religious Hindu like Gandhi who claims that for him 'every, the tiniest, activity is governed by' what he considers to be his religion, when faced with issues of collective life shuns away his religious bougie. Reflecting on the new state ideology once he wrote:

> I swear by my religion, I will die for it. But it is my personal affair. The state has nothing to do with it. The State will look after your secular welfare, health, communication, foreign

relations, currency and so on, but not my religion. That is everybody's personal concern.[88]

For Gandhi taking religion as every body's personal concern was a true and honest expression of the Hindu faith but for Muslims to accept this idea amounted to blasphemy, an open declaration of giving up the Islamic faith. Considering Islam as at par with Hinduism or any other religion and limiting it to individual's worship and meditation, a private concern, was like the invention of a new Islam tailored to meet the requirements of Muslim *Bhikshus*, a mischievous attempt to recast Islam in an Indian dye. Had secularism been taken as just another ideology, as an alien concept that, for some reason or the other, had come to dominate the political scene, the situation would not have been so alarming. But what appears devastating is the fact that the new state ideology of secularism was taken as a compatible ideology with that of Islam and even the wise among us, the Muslim leadership and the *Ulema* became its active and enthusiastic propagators. Unfortunately they missed the point that the new ideology is a *deen* in itself and has established itself in India only at the debris of the former *darul-Islam*. The Muslim intellectuals were not unaware of the Turkish experience where the secular mind had not only terminated the Khilafah but once secularism was accepted as the state ideology, it gradually replaced Islam from the entire social and political scene. The secular promise that guarantees protection and equal opportunity of development for all religions when it comes to Islam was a false promise owing to the very nature of Islam which wants to keep its own control on the state machinery. Our intellectuals probably missed the point that as compared to Islam, secularism was a rival religion which, as the Turkish experience goes, once allowed to have a say in state affairs

resulted in the very extinction of Islamic social life. In Turkey the expulsion of Islam was quick and decisive; the termination of the Khilafah in 1924, the banning of Religious Ordinance in 1925, the de-recognition of Islamic law code in 1926 and, eventually, the expulsion of Islam as a state religion in 1928.[89] Much similar were the experiences in Lenin's Russia where once religion was ejected from the state machinery the state in the name of reformation and development created such a situation that even at the level of community life religion could not survive. Those who found such historical evidences irrefutable and who found it difficult to defend the destructive nature of secularism gave yet another plea that the Indian version of secularism had nothing to do with Russian Communism or western atheism. Here in India, they argued, if the state has no religion it is not because it is inimical to religion but because in a multi-religious country it is difficult to have a state religion. They also argued that Indian secularism, instead of opposing any religion, guarantees equal opportunities for the propagation and development of all religions. In Hinduism which believes that all religions lead to the same truth and that they are just different roads to the same destination, the Indian secularism, as it is explained, is another way of expressing the Hindu thought. But for Muslims who consider themselves as the upholders of the Last Divine Mission and who claim to be the only people carrying the Last Revelation in its original form, even this version of secularism should not be acceptable. The fear of Hindu domination however left no other option for Muslims but to prefer secularism to Hinduism as a state religion. The option was limited; secularism, or the majority religion. Though both were the two facets of the same coin, the latter was, at least, a pleasant illusion in which the Muslims felt

comfort in taking refuge.[90] Had independent India adopted Hinduism as a state religion, Muslims would have been quick to voice their resentment and register their disagreement with the new system. But the commonly held opinion that secularism is a noncommittal ideology and a neutral polity made its easy entry into Muslim thought. The Muslim leadership and *Ulema* willingly approved a secular polity and accepted secularism as state ideology. In fact in secularism they found a place of refuge. Name any Muslim of prominence, from Maulana Azad down to our time, be he a religious figure like Hussain Ahmad Madani, political visionaries like Syed Mahmood and Abdul Jalil Faridi or from among the contemporary *Ulema* like Abul Hasan Ali Nadvi or Maulana Asad Madani, there is hardly any Muslim of prominence who does not consider secularism as a road to salvation for Indian Muslims. A quick look at the resolutions adopted by various Muslim organizations during the last 50 years or any significant report of their *milli* activity can easily lead us to conclude that secularism as a practicable ideology has become a corner stone of the Muslim faith. Due to the scarcity of space here I limit myself to a few examples from the writings of one of the most prominent Islamic scholars of free India, Abul Hasan Ali Nadvi. He writes:

> In secular constitution of India each community or nation has been guaranteed equally the freedom about their religion, culture and faith. The constitution regards different communities and religious groups as equals. For a country which is inhibited by various nations, divergent religious and ethnic groups this constitution is the best and the most suitable one.[91]

The impact of secularism on the Muslim mind is so strong that the Muslim intellectuals today feel at home with secular

ideals, and consider them as essential for the salvation of both Muslims and the country. As Abul Hasan Ali Nadvi bluntly puts it:

> Our country (India) is a vast and great land. Here at least there were three plants that had to be preserved. Their destruction resulted in the creation of three poisonous snakes. These three plants were namely the plants of nonviolence, of secularism and of democracy.[92]

The story does not end here. Most of the *Ulema* and Muslim leaders in independent India are staunch believers in and propagators of secularism. A public declaration of their faith in secularism is made in very many ways during the election campaigns when Muslim organizations make public appeals to voters for strengthening the secular parties and the stability of secular system. Through this futile exercise, an open Kufr is committed by almost all Muslim organizations, spiritual leaders *Ulema* and intellectuals barring a few exceptions. Things have come to such a pass that when one of the most towering scholars of Islam during his illness, almost on his death bed, received leader of the opposition Sonia Gandhi and Prime Minister A.B.Vajpayee, he advised both these politicians to stick to the principles of secularism, democracy and non violence.[93] This is a clear example to prove that the Muslim thought in post-independence India has gone completely out of Islam. If one learns from a God conscious and sincere scholar of world fame that individual and collective salvation lies in secular democratic ideals rather than in Islam, probably there can be no other alternative explanation for such mistaken utterances.

RELIGIOUS FREEDOM

Muslims' acceptance of secularism as an alternative

political ideology was a logical corollary of limiting Islam to the private life which for many reasons the secular system wanted not to have under its direct control. The idea of religious freedom was alien to the Islamic worldview. For Islam that symbolizes power and holds a direct control of human life the very idea of religious freedom is a pure nonsense. But the new situation where Islam was expelled from the position of authority or source of guidance had to discover a new role for Islam, reducing it to a mere morality. The constitutional provision for the freedom of religion enabling Muslims to practise Islam is in itself a declaration of the fact that Islam as a living civilization has ceased to exist, and the Ummah has come to such a pass where it finds solace in the constitutional guarantee of religious freedom. As for the implications of this religious freedom, to what extent it may control human life and where it ends its boundaries, no clear-cut answers were given. The Muslim Personal law and the *Shariah* are not interchangeable terms as common Muslims usually believe and find solace in the constitutional protection of this limited *Shariah*. Yet even this version of the Islamic *Shariah* is not spared. A continuous judicial interference in Muslim Personal Law and sometimes strange interpretations of Islamic law by the non-Muslim judges often raised in the Muslim mind a very basic question: Can a non-Muslim Judge be given the right to interpret *Shariah*? And is it lawful for Muslims to approach an un-Islamic court or a non-Muslim Judge for that matter, for the execution of *Shariah* rulings right under a non-Islamic system?

We have already mentioned that the idea of religious freedom was an alien concept and that the constitutional view of religious freedom had not taken Islam as a living, dominant and all-encompassing civilization of our time. The

framers of the Indian constitution while drafting this provision had other Indian religions in their mind. The idea of religion as it was prevalent among various Hindu sects or among Buddhists, Jains, Sikhs and Christians, was no more than a set of religious rites and rituals. It was not fair to include Islam in the same category. However in Article 125 (A) of the Indian Constitution one reads:

> Subject to public order, morality and health and to the other provisions of this Part, all persons are equally entitled to freedom of conscience and the right freely to profess, practice and propagate religion.[94]

This limited view of religious freedom brought Islam down to the level of other religions limiting it to some social rituals and modes of worship. As Iqbal aptly puts it: 'The freedom to worship and perform some religious rites has given Muslims a false illusion, that in India they are free to practice Islam.

ملا کو جو ہے ہند میں سجدے کی اجازت
ناداں یہ سمجھتا ہے کہ اسلام ہے آزاد

The ambit of religious freedom has not been clearly spelt out in the Constitution nor the Constitution tells us that when it speaks of religious freedom as which concept of religion it has under discussion. However a Supreme Court verdict involving a Hindu endowment case has this to say:

> What constitutes the essential part of a religion is primarily to be ascertained with reference to the doctrines of that religion itself. [95]

But this assurance of the court that the essential part of the religion is to be ascertained by the religion in question or that a religious group has the right to define its religion on its own cannot be taken seriously. For there are many instances when

the court has assumed the role of a religious reformer and has directly interfered in Hindu religious matters. For example the change in Hindu Personal Law, allowing a Hindu the right to divorce, banning the Child marriage, making inter-caste marriages legal, abolishing the institution of *Devdasi* and opening the doors of Hindu temples on Harijans are all indicative of the fact that the concept of religion as defined and practiced by the adherents of that religion has never been acceptable to the judiciary. We have also witnessed a similar attitude of the court in matters of Muslim Personal Law, which at times interpreted the provision in its own way, making it subservient to the uniform civil code — the directive principles of state policy. The idea of religious freedom as it was understood had no room for practicing Islam in full nor the Muslims ever read in it more than an assurance of holding religious gatherings and performing individual and congregational worship. Whatever the reasons may be for having this much of religious freedom in the Constitution the fact was that this concept of religion undermined Islam as an all-embracing religion in the Muslim mind.

As for the religions that believed in the separation of Church and State, this constitutional provision provided them a congenial atmosphere to flourish. In Hinduism the separation of Church and State did not pose any problem, as it had no concept of a central spiritual authority or an orchestrated state policy. A religion which had no idea of a state and had no well-defined Church, there, in fact, was no question of separating one from the another. On the contrary the idea of religious freedom that had based itself on the separation of the state and Church had posed a serious ideological problem for the Muslims who throughout their history believed in the unification of the two. The founders of

modern India and the framers of its Constitution, who though appearing to be generous enough to guarantee religious freedom for all, were at no cost willing to tolerate religious interference in matters of social and political importance. B.R. Ambedkar, taking part in the Constituent Assembly debates had clearly explained that 'we ought to strive hereafter to limit the definition of religion in such a manner that we shall not extend it beyond beliefs and such rituals as may be connected with ceremonials which are essentially religious'. He further argued that it was not necessary 'that the sort of laws, for instance, laws relating to tenancy or laws relating to succession should be governed by religion'. He wondered 'why religion should be given this vast expensive jurisdiction so as to cover the whole of life and to prevent the legislature from encroaching upon that field'.[96] Ambedkar's opinion cannot be taken as a mere individual aberration. Later, the Bombay High court, in several decisions held the same narrow interpretation of religion and what it meant by religious freedom guaranteed in Article 25(1), rather, going a step further, restricting it to ethical and moral precepts only:

> Therefore, whatever binds a man to his own conscience and whatever moral and ethical principles regulate the lives of men, that alone can constitute religion as understood in the Constitution. A religion may have many secular activities, it may have secular aspects, but these secular activities and aspects do not constitute religion as understood by the Constitution.[97]

An in-depth inquiry into the supposed constitutional guarantee of religious freedom leads us to conclude that this constitutional provision has little room for living an Islamic life as envisioned in the Book of Allah and Sunnah of the holy Prophet. The supposed religious freedom which the Muslims

came to believe in and for the stability of which their leadership had been constantly struggling had, in fact, little promise to fulfil, the demands of an Islamic life. A religion, as Islam is, which has a global agenda for peace and justice and which regards it essential to control the totality of human life found itself in a state of total incompatibility with the Indian Constitutional provision; its adherents simply wondered how to make use of this 'generous' provision.

MUSLIMS AND THE INDIAN NATIONALISM

Having already stated that nationalism had very much become a part of the Muslim thought during the independence movement, it in free India, however, lost its charisma. The Muslims were facing the worst situation of their history, a holocaust, and an organized pogrom. The concept of composite nationalism, the idea that Hindus and Muslims together, in collaboration with each other, will create the future India of their dreams, was a thing of the past. But the spell of composite nationalism which the Muslims had lived under for quite sometime and which they had come to regard as part of their Islamic faith was not so easy to shun. After independence owing to the harrowing tales of Muslim sufferings at the hands of co-nationalists, 'composite nationalism' as an idea was thrown into the dust-bin of history. Nonetheless, its legacy continued to affect the Muslim mind as they still believed that patriotism or loyalty to the land was part of the Islamic faith. *Hubbul-Watan Hubbul-Imaan* (love for the nation is love for the faith), an Arabic expression though otherwise opposed to Islamic tenets, had acquired some degree of sanctity due to its sheer Arabicness. There were many other Arabic sayings too, which, in this era of decline, had acquired the status of *Naṣ*, the basis of Islamic

judgement.[98]

Unlike Hinduism Islam does not believe in worshiping a piece of land or in its glorification. In the Islamic worldview national, linguistic, racial or geographical identities have no importance at all. Muslims look at the universe as an organic whole created for humans and made subservient to some natural laws. No part of the universe or a piece of land has a special glory or holiness attached to it unless otherwise decreed by God Himself. In Islam national identities are based on ideology and the world is basically divided into two nations; the Ummah of Islam and the Ummah of Kufr. A believer, no matter wherever he comes from, or which color, race or linguistic group he belongs to, Islamically speaking, he is an integral part of Islamic Ummah. Further, according to Islam, a believers' primary loyalty lies with the truth, transcending all the barriers of national and tribal loyalties. He has a religious obligation to support the Islamic agenda of truth and justice. His first and foremost loyalty is to Allah and His Prophet, a loyalty that is so essential in Islam that it undermines all other loyalties. This is the true Islamic position on which there is no disagreement among Muslims. But the nationalist idea which had gained currency in the hey days of India's freedom struggle and which was supposed to be a natural expression of hatred against the British Raj had its far-reaching impact on the Muslim mind. The Muslims came to believe that the loyalty to nation is almost equivalent to loyalty to Allah and His Prophet; *Hubb-ul-Watan Hubb-ul-Imaan*. Later, after independence, one witnesses in the Muslim vocabulary the term *Mulk* (country) and *Millat* (Muslim community) as equivalent and interchangeable terms. The Muslim leadership considered the loyalty to country and the Muslim community as one and the same thing making us

believe that the service of the country and that of the community not only amounted to doing the same thing but more so it was very much rooted in the Islamic teachings. Muslims' enthusiasm for the service of Indian nation reached such an intensity that they openly declared that they have nothing to do with the interest of the Ummah if it falls outside the national boundaries. Maulana Hussain Ahmad Madani, the chief of Deoband seminary and the most influential Aalim of post-independence India, called upon Muslims to take care of the national interest of Indian Muslims alone:

> The division of India has also divided the Muslim interest. Now what is good for the Pakistani Muslims may not necessarily be good in the interest of Indian Muslims. On the contrary, it is very much possible that there can be something profitable for Pakistani Muslims and the same thing can be equally harmful for the Indian Muslims. Obviously, we are not responsible for the Muslims of Pakistan; they themselves have to sort out their problems. We are only obliged to take care of the interest of four Crore Muslims of the Indian Union. We have taken all the necessary measures that can safeguard the interests of Muslims living in the Indian union. The more we develop in ourselves the understanding of Islamic teachings and put them into practice in future we will be in a better position to emerge as proud soldiers of this beloved nation and significant ingredient of this land.[99]

The secret and easy entry of nationalism into the body politic of Islam had been instrumental in transforming the international Ummah of Islam into a fragmented lot, divided into various nation-states. It resulted not only in the geographical division of Ummah but because of it the very Islamic thought had to develop within a nation-state

framework. In Islam the loyalty to Allah and His Prophet has been an unshakable belief, subservient to all other loyalties. But once the division of Ummah's interest on national grounds became acceptable and got justified on an ideological plain, it was possible for Muslims to proclaim that 'certainly we are loyal but our loyalty rests with the motherland alone'.[100] The loyalty to nation became unconditional and its proclamation a true expression of Islamic belief. Later, Abul Kalam Azad made it an essential condition for Muslims if they were to lead a peaceful and comfortable life in India. He said: 'Your unconditional loyalty to the Indian Union will leave no room for your discomfort and remorse'.[101] Had such nationalist rhetoric been a mere product of an oppressive ruthless system, limited to political statements, there was no need to take it so seriously. But the situation became alarming when the Muslim masses took such aberrations as an authentic expression of Islamic *Aqeeda* and the *Ulema* openly came out to make us believe that serving the system of Kufr was obligatory on Muslims. This generation of Muslim leadership made a great mistake by taking the two words *Mulk* and *Millat* as synonyms ignoring the fact that *Mulk* is a geographical reality with its limited boundaries while *Millat* is an international entity with unchanging universal boundaries. But for this generation of leadership, which, sometimes in its history, had even believed in the creation of an Ummatic identity on the basis of geographical boundaries, it was not so strange to get confused on such issues. National loyalty attained such a prominence in the Muslim mind that even for the future of Islam in this country the Muslims had to find such ways that may not cast a shadow of doubt on their primary loyalty to the nation. Now if the Muslims were thoughtful of their future the only course left for them was to prove their worth

in the democratic system and project themselves as its true and sincere servants. In the words of Maulana Hussain Ahmad Madani:

> If Muslims really want a bright future for themselves they must prove their worth and utility with their words and deeds. The more they will prove themselves worthy for the Indian nation, the more they will get respect and recognition. In a democratic system of governance promotion or recognition does not come from one's racial or religious identity but it solely comes from the individual's own talent and service. We must prepare ourselves with true and sincere intentions for the service of *Mulk* and *Millat*. The success will eventually come in our way.[102]

It is not easy to say whether this generation of Muslim leadership consciously ignored this point or they were unaware of the fact that the interest of *Mulk* and that of the *Millat* always do not overlap each other or move hand in hand in one direction. The new agenda to re-glide the banner of Islam through the service of nation, as put forward by Hussain Ahmad Madani, was based more on a certain understanding of the contemporary situation than on a fresh look at the Book of Allah and Sunnah of His Prophet. The new agenda, instead of basing on the Quran and Sunnah has based itself on the ground realities, on the premise that the Muslims are now a part of the democratic system of the Indian Union where the promotion and recognition lie in proving one's worth and therefore it was made obligatory on all Muslims of India to nurture in themselves a true spirit of service. But what they meant by this true spirit or what role was expected of the Muslims in a non-Islamic system, the leadership ignored this question altogether.

At times it so clearly appeared to the Muslims that the

loyalty to nation and the loyalty to *Millat* are opposed to each other. But for those who had developed a habit of speaking of *Mulk-o-Millat*, of the two loyalties in one breath, for them when the time came to choose any one of the two, they displayed a quick preference to the national loyalty over their *milli* commitments. Even those who were supposed to be the authentic scholars of Islam, known for their Islamic commitments, they too fell prey to nationalism when faced with this dilemma. To prove this point I quote a passage from the autobiography of the most celebrated Islamic scholar of post-independence India. He tells us, in his own simple words, how he once had to face this dilemma:

> India, once known to the outside world for its love for peace, brotherhood and nonviolence is witnessing now, time and again, such shameful incidents that give it a bad name and make the Indians visiting outside hang their heads in shame. I tell you frankly that on 9th January 1992, I met the Indian Prime Minister Narsimha Rao in Delhi. Close on heels, I had received an invitation from the Makkah based world's largest Muslim organization, the Muslim World League, of which I am a founder member. All necessary arrangements for my travel were already made but, in the last minute, I declined to take up the journey thinking that if they ask me about the tragedy of 6th December and the communal riots that followed it, what will I have to say? I cannot tell a lie nor can I speak the truth, therefore, I preferred not to go.[103]

The entry of alien concepts such as nationalism and 'national interest' into the body philosophy of Islam made the Muslims spiritually weak and intellectually confused. A clear preference to the national interest over the Muslim interest makes it clear that Indian Muslims are no more a part

of the same Ummah that the Prophet once described as one body. Today the national identity of Indian Muslims owing to their belief in Indian secularism has limited their intellectual horizon and they are making futile attempts to solve their problems within the political boundaries of India. Now in the Muslim mind the secular democracy is an ideology so close to Islam that all those purely local and national symbols which have nothing to do with Islam have acquired religious meaning in their day-to-day life. Things have come to such a pass that even those who claim to be the authority on the *Shariah* or have emerged amongst us as self-styled *Shariah*-chiefs feel no hesitation in their salutations to the national flag or paying homage to the national symbols. In recent years, the event of unfurling the national flag by the self-proclaimed *Shariah*-chief in Bihar and his proclamation of the Independence day as *Yaum-e-Ihtesab* (Day of Reckoning) clearly show that the Muslims have not only embraced the new secular ideology but have also found appropriate Islamic terminology for this new religion.

In India a serious debate on such sensitive issues is yet to start and Muslims are yet to analyze the negative implications of secular system on their religious life. If Islam is opposed to nation-states, is it still allowed for Muslims to salute a national flag. The US Supreme Court found it difficult to decide in a case involving compulsory salutation to national flag by school children. Children belonging to a Christian sect called Jehovah's Witnesses were exempted from compulsory salutation on the plea that according to their belief this act amounted to idolatry.[105] In the Indian situation however Muslims were so mesmerized by the secular democracy and so terrorized by the state machinery that no such debate could ever start. And as the Muslims' conversion to secularism

was total, even the biggest *Shariah* experts did not dare raise a conscientious objection or bothered to seek an Islamic verdict on this issue.

UOLUL AMR OR THE AUTHORITY

Central to the Islamic political thought is the idea of *Uolul Amr*, the authority. The obedience to the authority is considered as the obedience to Allah and His prophet. The authority, or the political leadership as we call it, is the very nucleus around which Muslims have to organize their social and political life. However, in Sir Syed we witness, for the first time, a change in attitude towards the authority, seeking a new definition of the term. He is the first among the Muslim thinkers to justify the legitimacy of a non-Muslim authority probably owing to the fall of Delhi. But as we have pointed out earlier, his views did not easily gain ground among the Muslims as one can hardly trace a religious scholar of prominence in his time supporting this opinion. Earlier, we have also pointed how Muhammed Ali, during the Khilafah Movement, assigned a leadership role to a non-Muslim like Gandhi whom he called a great spiritual seer. And our readers might recall how quick was he in realizing this fatal mistake and eventually placing Gandhi where he should be in an Islamic scheme, as a nonbeliever. In Islam there is no way that a non-Muslim can assume the political or spiritual leadership of Muslims. The authority to rule over Muslims is mainly drawn from the ruler's pledge that he is taking charge of the Ummah as a deputy of the holy Prophet, upon whom be peace.

In free India there were mainly two centers of power; the spiritual authority was vested in Gandhi while the state machinery was in full control of Nehru. The leaders in the

Congress, be they Muslims or otherwise, were accustomed to talking of a future India of Gandhian ideals and values. For the Muslims it was for the first time in their history when after a fierce struggle and bloodshed they found themselves the citizens of a country that had founded itself on Gandhian ideals and taken a non-Muslim as the Father of Nation and who, despite all his spiritual claims had nothing to do with the Prophet and his mission. Some might still think that the spiritual authority, especially after independence, came to symbolize in Maulana Azad who was commonly referred to by Muslims as Amirul Hind. But to me the ceremonial value of the title Amirul Hind does not carry much weight as one finds that Azad's spiritual self, despite his recognition as a great Islamic scholar and interpreter of the Quran, always looks at Gandhi as a mahatma and as a great spiritual seer. And as for the political authority, the *Uolul Amr*, in free India Muslims had no illusion that all the executive power was vested in Prime Minister Nehru. Muslims had the experience of many major setbacks in their history; like the reversal in the battle of Uhad, the sack of Baghdad and the fall of Muslim Delhi, but even in their worst days they did not imagine that one day their religious leaders and men of prominence would willingly accept a non-Muslim as a spiritual seer and take him as their role model. For them it was hard to believe that a man like Hussain Ahmad Madni would exhort the Muslims to work 'for humanity, democracy, equality and peace because the mahatma (Gandhi, the great soul) had laid down his precious life for these noble ideals'.[106] He even went to the extent of urging the Muslims that they should regard the ideals of democratic India as their own mission statement.[107] Among the Muslims the Gandhian ideals had attained such a degree of sanctity that in order to prove an

argument it was considered enough to say that it enjoyed the support of Gandhi and Nehru. For example, one reads in the editorial of the prestigious journal *Burhan*, the organ of *Nawatul Musannefin*, that 'whatever it writes is true and sound because there can't be any better criteria to judge a truth than the fact that the same opinion is held by Gandhiji, and the Congress president and the same is embraced by the Indian Prime Minister'.[108] An obituary on Gandhi published in the same Journal, that depicts him as a role model for all Indians holding his ideals as a sure way to success and prosperity, is quite revealing as how in free India Muslims felt attracted to the Gandhian way:

> God has finally plucked away the precious Jewel from the Indian crown, the *Kohe-Noor*, the only worthy metal on the shabby dress of humanity, that which, in this filthy selfish world, was the only and the last hope both for India and humanity, the only one in whom we had the hope for the revival of our great past.[109]
>
> It was divinely ordained that Gandhiji, like other benefactors of humanity and preachers of morality, should die a death of helplessness. Although his body is not amongst us today his soul is forever to live. Every particle of his cremated body is calling on us saying the secret of life lies in nonviolence and truth. If India, or any other country for that matter, wants to prosper and develop it has no other option but to stick to these two principles.[110]

If the most prestigious journal of the Indian *Ulema* lays down the Gandhian principles as the prerequisites for progress and development of a country where then one will turn for Islamic guidance. And if the followers of Muhammed become propagators of Gandhian ideology who will call people to Allah and His prophet. For in the same editorial we are told

that sticking to these principles 'will make Gandhi's soul rest in peace and our lives peaceful and prosperous'.[111] What a great pity! The spiritual and moral ideals of Gandhi overshadow the prophetic teachings of Muhammed and the Muslims, more than the non-Muslim inhabitants of this land, feel desperate to lay the mahatma's soul rest in peace.

In free India Muslims had no hesitation in referring to Gandhi as a spiritual model. Even prominent Muslims like Azad and Madani had no reservation in calling him a *mahatma*, the great soul. The Gandhian religion that consists of *Khadi*, *Charkha* and nonviolence was commonly held by Muslims as an ideal way of life. The Gandhian *sunnah* of *charkha* was also popular among many prominent *Ulema* of the time. It is on record that once Maulana Husain Ahmad Madani, while leading a funeral prayer, became furious when he came to notice that the dead-body was not wrapped in Khadi.[112] Gandhi had become such a point of reference for them, that whenever the Muslims suffered at the hands of the secular system their leadership was quick to point out that the country was digressing from the Gandhian way. The Muslim leaders, in the secret of their hearts, might have believed otherwise but the fact was that through their words and deeds they made us believe that the salvation of the country lay only in the adoption of Gandhian principles of nonviolence and secular democracy.

Gradually, however, the enthusiasm for Gandhian principles subsided as the Muslims realized that the anti-Muslim riots were the real face and logical outcome of nonviolence and secularism. Disgusted with the Nehruvian ideals of secular-democracy, some desperate souls among Muslims started their search for an alternative. The Lucknow convention organized by Syed Mahmud in 1964 was basically

an attempt to carve out another *Uolul-Amr* from within the secular system. And if the convention failed to formulate a new strategy it was mainly because the organizers lacked the required courage and guts to look beyond the secular statecraft. Dr.Abdul Jalil Faridi, who emerged as the first rebel during the 1967 elections, calling on Muslims to raise the banner of revolt against the Congress, soon found himself in a blind alley as there was not enough scope for a major change within the system. Probably Faridi and his associates were not aware of the fact that without a proper review of our political attitude the creation of a new polity was not possible. No doubt they were the first to expose the constitutional and legal machinations through which the system had blocked the emergence a Muslim political force, nevertheless they very much failed to realize that a new polity cannot be shaped without a total rejection and expulsion of alien ideologies that have cropped up in the Muslim thinking during decades of secular indoctrination.

Once a non-Muslim *Uolul Amr*, the political authority, became acceptable to Muslims it was quite natural for them to digress from the Islamic agenda or devote themselves for a system other than Islamic. It is no exaggeration to say that a general acceptance of non-Muslim leadership among Muslims was a turning point, leading to the change of the Muslim agenda itself. Nehru's popularity among Muslims partly owes to his secular, nonpartisan image and partly to the prevailing confusion in the Muslim mind that there was nothing wrong in taking a non-Muslim as Uolul Amr. The obituaries on Nehru that appeared in Urdu journals and newspapers of the time projected him as the messiah of the Ummah, as if in his death the Muslims had lost a real mentor. The last fifty years have witnessed the emergence of many

such mentors equally popular among Muslims. We have a number of fatwas and appeals signed by the most prominent *Ulema* and religious leadership of our time calling upon Muslims to come under the banner of Mr. so and so, who, in their opinion, has come to fight for a seemingly Islamic cause of social justice.[113] Throughout their history the leadership of Muslims has been vested in a believer only. In Islamic history it never happened before that the *Ulema* of Islam were calling upon people to entrust the authority into a non-Muslim's hands or doing their best to legitimize an un-Islamic system. This intellectual disaster was greater in magnitude than the sack of Baghdad in 1258 or even the termination of the Khilafah in 1924 for it amounted to the eventual death of the living and self-generating civilization of Islam. Once Bapu, the father – as Gandhi was referred to, came to be regarded as the Father of Nation it became so obvious that hence onward, in this country, the Islamic agenda will be subservient to Gandhian aspirations. And once a generation of Muslim scholars came under the sway of Gandhi it became easier for the later generations to look for the Bapus of their own age. This intellectual digression and its ideological implications helped create serious doubts about the very relevance of the Prophet's personality to our time, making him only an object of eulogies and glorification in the *milad* ceremonies while leaving the entire practical world under the guidance and control of *Kuffar-o-Mushrekeen*.

DARUL-ISLAM VERSUS DARUL-KUFR

The Muslim's attitude towards a country is mainly shaped by the *Shariah* rulings, depending on weather the country in question is an abode of Islam or not. I have already discussed above that the new religion of secularism could become

acceptable to Muslims only when it was wrapped and presented in popular *fiqhi* terminology. The crisis of the Muslim mind came to full view after independence when Muslims were faced with the definition of the new *dar* that was founded on Gandhian ideology and controlled by Nehruvian polity. Can India be still called a Darul Islam? They surmised. The early fuqha had classified the *dar* into some eighteen categories. But none of them were considered applicable in the Indian situation where the illusion of power sharing had made the Muslims believe that they were not mere subjects but very much equal partners in the democratic process. Some of them thought probably it was a unique situation in their history and therefore the classical *fiqh* cannot be applied to it. And those who still emphasized on a *fiqhi* definition found the *darul moa'heda* as its closest equivalent. They probably saw a semblance of the Indian situation in the Medina-treaty made by the Prophet himself with the local Jewish population for a joint defence of the city against any foreign intervention. However, they missed the point that the treaty in Medina had brought the Prophet to the position of ultimate authority, while in the Indian situation, the treaty, by which they meant the Indian Constitution, had given the majority a clear edge over Muslims. They also conveniently ignored the fact that in Medina the treaty was made by the Prophet himself, the undisputed leader of the Muslim community, whereas those who claimed to be the representatives of the Muslim community in the Constituent Assembly could by no Islamic rulings be called Muslim representatives. In Islam only the Khalifah or his nominee has the authority to make a treaty on behalf of the Ummah. The classical *fiqhi* debate on *dar* might not shed much light on the Indian situation, nevertheless, Islam clearly divides the

world into two units; *darul-Islam* and *darul-kufr*. Different categories of darul-kufr are given different nomenclature depending on their relations with the Islamic State. The earlier *fuqaha* have clearly indicated that despite their varying attitude towards the Islamic state, whether they have a peace-treaty or an open hostility, all these states will fall within the broader category of *darul-kufr*. None of them can be regarded as an equivalent to the darul-Islam. To justify their own stand the Congressite *Ulema* were guilty of misinterpreting the Medina treaty. They mistook *darul-amn* or *darul-moa'heda* as yet another nomenclature for *darul-Islam* demanding from the Muslims the same attitude that they should have towards *darul-Islam*:

> If Pakistan can become a darul-Islam by simply adopting a resolution then it is not fair to argue that India with its newly adopted constitution is still a darul-Kufr especially when we know that the constitution has declared it a secular state. And a secular government is one that is impartial towards all religious groups. The constitution, as we know, openly declares that Muslims, same as other religious groups, will enjoy a complete freedom in religious and cultural affairs. As for calling this country a *darul-moa'heda* or *darul-amn* this much of constitutional guarantee is enough.[114]

However even those who confused the term *darul-amn* or *darul-moa'heda* with that of *darul-Islam* had some vague notion that this secular state was not a *darul-Islam* either. The attempt to justify the new *dar* on Islamic grounds, calling it an abode of peace or land of treaty, with ill-found analogies and wrongly picked up terminology further confused the issue for those who in their own right have produced academic works on the topic.[115] How the *Shariah* and the Constitution

were woven together in their minds or taken as interchangeable terms can be seen in the following passage:

> Islamically speaking, constitutionally India is a darul-Amn for Muslims as they, like the Hindus, enjoy an equal claim on this land and its government. It is therefore absurd to call it darul-Kufr. Those who look at it otherwise may be for them the very secularism of India is enough ground to regard it darul-Kufr. If that be the case then the Indian government need not take such religious pronouncements (fatwas) too seriously, for judged from this angle we will find that governments of Turkey, Indonesia, Iraq and Syria — all of them are secular governments.[116]

A general acceptance of secularism among Muslims gradually made *fiqhi* discussion on the *dar* as expressions of outdated *maulveic* thinking. A constant threat to their life and limb in this supposed darul-amn however made Muslims raise their doubts, from time to time, about the well-publicized illusions of this 'abode of peace', the secular state.

The failure to have a proper understanding of the *dar* and its application to the Indian situation took the entire Ummah in a wrong direction. In the given scenario of communal riots it was difficult to believe that India was an abode of peace or a land of treaty. There were no answers to these questions as who made the treaty and when. Those who considered the members of the Constituent Assembly as parties to the treaty were not very sure of the Islamic legitimacy of the Assembly and of its Muslim members. In Islam only the Khalifah or his nominee has the right to enter into a treaty with a non-Muslim group or the state. As for the Muslim members of the Constituent Assembly, they were neither nominees of the Khalifah nor Muslims had chosen them as their

representatives. The fact was that the entire Constituent Assembly that had to draft a democratic constitution comprised of people who made their entry into it in a purely non-democratic fashion. The Muslim members of the Assembly were doubly discredited; both on the Islamic and democratic grounds. The irony that an assembly constituted to draft a blue-print for future democracy was a jamboree of non-democratically chosen people was probably not that difficult to swallow but to prove that the country was the land of treaty needed proper *Sharei* arguments than a mere play on Islamic jargon. And as the Muslim thought and polity were no more operating within the Islamic framework, a Sharei judgement to this effect became almost impossible. So much so that the remnants of Maudoodi's Jamaat-e-Islami, known for its understanding of Islam in black and white terms, instead of meddling with the Sharei opinion about the *dar* took refuge in yet another terminology of 'dar-al-dawah',[118] a clear case of playing on jargon.

The failure to determine the true nature of *dar* or placing the Indian situation in proper Islamic perspective also owes to some mistaken perceptions of the democratic system which had successfully created the impression that Muslims are an equal partner and a power sharer. Some even believed that it was the same democracy that initially Islam introduced to the world. But this view of the Indian democracy was no more than an illusion as those who were supposed to be Muslim power-sharers were in reality no more than mere puppets in the hands of the party leaders. Probably Azad was the only exception who had some degree of confidence about himself otherwise every Muslim politician had always this feeling that his power-portfolio is a mere blessing of the party high command. Dr. Zakir Hussain had always this feeling

that for all his political ascendancy he owes much to Nehru, similar was the feeling of Fakhruddin Ali Ahmad, the rubber stamp President of Indira Gandhi's creation. The proxy leadership, or the puppet-politicians bearing Muslim names, blinded Muslims of the harsh political realities. The helplessness and disillusionment of a man like Azad was not a secret though and the Muslims had seen how on sensitive Muslim issues such as the Urdu language — a language so dear to him — he had to keep his mouth shut during the Constituent Assembly debates. The general acceptance of the proxy-leadership on the one hand and the misunderstanding that democracy is yet another name for the Islamic Shura system conveyed a general impression that the new system is not totally alien to Islam so as to call India darul-Kufr. As to the question why then, Muslims are suffering at the hands of the system, the entire responsibility is conveniently placed on their own 'non-democratic upbringing':

> This is a harsh but historically proven fact that Islam is basically a religion of the masses, of the humanity in general. It is a democratic religion indeed. The Islamic God is the God of the universe, its Prophet benefactor of humanity, its book Quran a guidance for all men and the Muslim Ummah a witness unto the entire human race. But despite the democratic nature of Islam it is a fact that Muslims had never been democratic in their attitude except in the early era.[119]

The democratic machinations of this ruthless system gave no time to this ever-declining Ummah to take stock of the situation from an Islamic standpoint. The illusion that democracy is part of the Islamic *aqeeda* was taken as a commonly held reality that the Ummah had to take as its own mission statement. Those who wanted to voice their

resentment against this ruthless and oppressive system were calmed down by such consoling words as: 'Had they (Muslims) been accustomed to a democratic living, upholding an Islamic attitude towards this world and its inhabitants they would not have felt in the present situation so depressing, nor found themselves in such a state of utter helplessness and disillusionment.'[120]

The common Muslim mistook secular democracy as another variety of the Islamic Shura system and those who knew well that it is a religion in itself different from Islam kept their mouths shut owing to the pressure of the oppressive system lest they should be dubbed as anti-nationals. To say that the democratic system was the most suitable one in the given situation needed no logical argument as it was considered sufficient to say, as Abul Hasan Ali Nadvi aptly put it, that 'now there is nothing much to say about democracy as it is a system globally accepted'.[121] In free India, Muslim organizations and *Ulema* display an extraordinary enthusiasm to see the secular democratic ideals properly established. They do not feel ashamed of openly working for the Gandhian ideals thereby committing treachery on the already frozen Islamic Agenda.[122]

Apart from the illusion of power-sharing, the social and cultural manifestations of the so-called religious life was yet another factor that stopped the Ummah from coming to terms with reality. Muslims were no doubt living a secular life but the old religious terminology was very much in use. The secular India also witnessed the emergence of a magnificent *Shariah* board and the pompous words like *Qazi-e-Shariat, Amir-e-Shariat, Amirul Hind* etc. were still in use. The religious leadership had successfully tamed Islam. And a new version of the *Shariah* had come into existence calling

upon the Muslims to live an Islamic life right under the Kufr system. In the Indian context the *Shariah* became an equivalent term for Muslim Personal Law, a Hanafi interpretation of the Muslim Laws concerning marriage, divorce and inheritance etc. The protection of the Personal Law came to be regarded as the protection of the *Shariah* itself which in its own right should be enforced and implemented rather than calling for its own protection. There were people among us seeking allegiance or the bayia'h for themselves as the *Shariah*-chief or *Amirul Hind* ensuring a purely Islamic living only a bayia'h away. Then we had the *darul-qadha*, the supreme Islamic court of appeal and justice, comfortably functioning under the Kufr system limiting the Islamic issues only to matters of marriage, divorce and inheritance. These courts had no executive power but the pompous names given to their functionaries had successfully created a general feeling about Islam's compatibility with the secular system. This new version of the *Shariah* that still enjoys a general acceptance and popularity in India has its roots not in Quran and Sunnah, instead it bases itself on a popular Arabic proverb *'Ma la Yudrak Kullahu La Yatruk Jullahu'*, an open violation of the Quranic injunctions *'Udkholu fissilme Kaffah'* and *'wa Nazzalna alaik al-Kitab tabyana likulle shai'*. This faulty understanding of the Islamic *Shariah* that it can be practised within the secular system on the one hand stopped the thinking Muslims from realizing the true destructive nature of secular state and on the other created a general impression that the *Shariah* is a set of some outdated family laws that can be observed within any political setup. Once the theory of a supposed Islamic life within a secular framework became established Muslim intellectuals started thinking as to what can be a Muslim citizen's rights in a non-Islamic state.

However, on this issue a purely conceptual debate could not start because in free India the Quranic guidance was considered necessary in matters of family laws alone, the other social and political issues were deemed fit to be discussed within the constitutional ambit. Even the so-called *Shariah* authorities when it come to political issues, openly and unashamedly preferred the constitution as a book of reference to the Quran and Sunnah.[123]

The Muslim mind that had been facing an intense intellectual crisis for long was, after independence, no more healthy enough for a creative response to the new Indian situation. Nevertheless, there remained a hope that the intellectual diaspora of Muslims will come to an end owing to their disillusionment with alien ideologies that in practical spheres have produced a series of unending communal riots. Within the Muslim community there was no dearth of desperate souls voicing their resentment against the system, however they lacked the required guts and courage to engineer an ideological coup. A revolt against the secular ideology or for that matter a *fiqhi* evaluation of the state ideology needed, as we were told by the *Ulema*, more than an insight into the *Quran* and *Sunnah*, a very special knowledge which, according to this view, only the rightful *Ulema* possessed. And as the *Ulema* through various coercive means wanted to monopolize Islamic consciousness they laid down extra qualifications for analyzing the situation from an Islamic angle. The potential intellectual coup therefore became their sole monopoly, belying all hopes for a return of Muslim political thought to its ideological home, Islam. The Ummah must follow only those *Ulema*, we were told by Qari Muhammed Tayib — the most revered guru of the Deobandi *Ulema* of his time — who possess *Ilm Ladunni* and *Ilme Ma'rfah* and who, instead of

merely depending on the Revelation, are also capable of employing what God has revealed secretly unto their hearts. Laying the essential prerequisites for modern-day religious leadership he wrote:

> (For him) it is not enough to be a scholar merely capable of delivering lectures or teaching books rather, in a sense, he must have around him the hallow of being a deputy of the Prophet and his knowledge bearing a note of perfection. This leadership must be flawless and Godly protected. Their piety and God-consciousness and their sensitivity and care to Islamic issues must reflect that they will neither mislead nor be mislead by others. They are the people who neither misguide people nor their own wrong notions make them go astray. When the twin qualities of 'inner-revelation' and 'divine protection' get public recognition such *Ulema* deserve to be called flawless in their own rights.[124]

The 'tamed' Islamic religion, the only form of Islam constitutionally guaranteed to survive in the secular system, was also projected as the only authentic version by the *Ulema* of the Congressite hue. To prove the authenticity of their standpoint they need not base their arguments in the Quran and Sunnah, as they, in their own claim, were upholding greater knowledge what they termed as *Ilm Ladunni, Ilqa-e-rabbani* and *ilham-e-batani* etc. Had these *Ulema*, instead of projecting a lifeless Islam as the only true version, clearly indicated that in the given scenario only this much of Islam was practicable, this stance would have carried only a strategic value. And it would have saved the Muslim mind from further confusion. But alas! The popular trend to accept an argument on the basis of a hallow attached to the *Ulema* rather than judging it on the basis of the *Quran* and *Sunnah*

left no room for a revival of Islamic thought. The projection of purely alien concepts in seemingly Islamic epistemologies such as *Ilham, Ilqa, Uloom-e-Batini, Ilm Ladunni* etc. were instrumental in shifting the nucleus of Islamic thought from the *Quran* and *Sunnah* to the personal whims or understanding rather, misunderstandings of the *Ulema*. It is a well-known fact that in Islam any *Ilqa* or personal revelation, even if it comes from the noblest or most pious scholar, has no importance at all in comparison to the Last Revelation. As for *Ilm Ladunni*, this terminology is not only opposed to Islamic *aqeeda*, it is also linguistically unsound. According to the Islamic *aqeeda*, the Quran is the last and complete record of the Divine Revelation transmitted to the Ummah through the Prophet in its pure and original form. The history has it that on the day of the Arafah the Prophet while delivering his last sermon made witness to the entire Ummah that he had conveyed them the message. Now after such clear declarations if some people still believe that there were certain things which the Prophet told only to a few privileged ones or if someone thinks that certain people are in the possession of special knowledge, the *Ilm-e-batini*, it amounts to no less than a blasphemy. The Islamic knowledge is now the collective property of the Ummah, nay rather of the entire humanity. The Prophet has done his job well and has transmitted to us Islam in full, leaving no room for latter-day pseudo-prophets to interpret it in the light of their own 'personal revelations' or whims.

The subcontinent Islam had a long tradition of employing sufistic terminology to explain Islamic spiritualism. Words like *Kashf* and *Ilham* were not new to the Indian Muslim mind. Those aware of the writings of *Mojaddid Alf Thani* and *Shah Waliullah* were familiar with the graphic accounts of their

dreams warning them how to act in the given situation. Waliullah's claim that he had been appointed as *Qaemuzzaman* and *Wali-e-Asr* also owed to his sufistic dream or Kashf, probably a way of dreaming while awake. It was in this background that when the *Ulema*, in their judgement of the secular system and formulation of the new Islamic agenda, came to rely on their own visions and revelations, it appeared to the common Muslims nothing unusual or unnatural. Later, this trend of looking at the *Ulema* as infallible or as recipient of 'small revelation' became so established that when Syed Abul Hasan Ali Nadvi had to pay homage to Indian secularism he, instead of bothering to justify it on Islamic grounds, considered it sufficient to rely on his own feelings saying that it was a divinely ordained system for India. 'To ensure a better future, the elders of this country considered it necessary to make it (India) democratic, secular and nonviolent. This decision was in fact a Divine Ordination',[125] he claimed.

This so called divinely ordained system that has established itself on the debris of a former *darul-Islam* considered religion, including Islam, a private affair of the individual. Having taken a full control of social and political life the new state ideology developed into a full-fledged religion with secularism, democracy, nonviolence, composite nationalism, pluralism and patriotism as its essential elements. The national flag, national anthem, and the national song became the symbols and rituals of this new religion. Emotionally, no doubt, the Muslims were very much attached to Islam but in the social life these alien concepts had a deadening effects on them. The Islamic seminaries and Arabic universities that were supposed to teach Islamic Internationalism, there too, the national symbols were held in high esteem. The unfurling of the national flag and the

celebration of the national day or national festivals were done by the *Shariah* experts themselves. However, one could easily notice a lack of enthusiasm in these celebrations as compared to similar events held at non-Muslim or secular institutions. An emotional attachment to Islam, a deep sense of lost glory and a constant pressure to be a part of the national mainstream sometimes compelled a Muslim leader to assert vigorously that 'we Muslims know nothing about any national mainstream, the only thing in fact we care about is the Islamic stream.[126] But in the political sphere Muslims were very much part of the secular mainstream and addicted to a purely secular polity. This new religion of secularism had nurtured such a deep sense of patriotism in our Ulema that once Maulana Asad Madani had to resign from the Muslim Majlise Mushawarat simply because, in his opinion, 'the Mushawart did not play any significant role' on the eve of Indo-Pak war.[127] In a similar vein one finds Dr.Zakir Hussain declaring his loyalty to the nation and its creed. Before his ascendancy to the Presidency Dr. Hussian found himself under heavy attack from the revivalist Hindus who alleged him to be an orthodox Muslim opposed to any changes in the Muslim Personal Law. To this, he hastily reacted by saying that he was never opposed to the changes in Muslim Personal Law, on the contrary, what he meant was that 'this demand for change should come from within the Muslim community'.[128]

Among the converts to this new religion were those who had gone through a complete transformation of mind and heart. For them it was a matter of shame and disgrace to call themselves Muslims or trace their Islamic past. For example, Abdul Karim Chagla, a prominent Muslim of secular hue, proudly declared that he had Hindu blood in his veins. M.F.Hussain, a famous artist, had to say that he, as compared

to Islam, always felt closer to Hinduism.[129] And no different was the case of Syed Shahbuddin, once the most celebrated leader of the Babri Masjid Movement, whose uncompromising loyalty to the secular religion made him declare Nehru as his role model.

Those converted to the new religion (of secularism) were not few in numbers. Together they included different varieties of pseudo, secular and political Muslims. Some even went to the extent of committing outright Kufr; for example, the adoption of devotional posture in the Hindu temples and in front of the statue of Hindu deities by a Muslim governor of Bihar and a Muslim Railway Minister, the conducting of *arti* – a traditional Hindu ritual – on the return of a Muslim Home Minister from the Haj, the prostrating of a Muslim Minister before Ms. Jaya Lalita – the then chief-minister in Tamil Nadu, were clear indications of the fact that the Muslims' conversion to Secularism was total. Once the Muslims divorced Islam in the collective affairs of life, substituting it with secularism, such shameful incidents were only the logical outcome.

Yet there was another group of converts emotionally unwilling to divorce Islamic ideology but practically very much working for the stability of the secular system. Mention has already been made of Maulana Hussain Ahmad Madani who, in the very early days of independence, urged Muslims to consider the agenda of secular India as their own mission statement. The birth of free India thus coincided with the hijacking of Islamic agenda. If a community openly and professedly takes up an agenda other than Islam and calls upon people to work for the stability of a system other than Islamic then there can't be any doubt about its intellectual or ideological apostasy. It was mainly because of this diversion

that led the Ulema and Shariah experts to consider purely national symbols as familiar elements of Muslim faith. Some of them regarded the independence day as the Day of Reckoning *(Yaum-e-Ihtasab)* while others deeming it fit to celebrate it with the distribution of sweets, a sort of secular *parshad*. It is no more a secret now that the intellectual conversion of the Indian Muslims is total. Yet if one hears, from time to time, some voices of dissent or the call for the protection of Muslim Personal Law it is mainly because this generation of Muslims still feels emotionally rooted in Islam. They do not consider a salutation to the national flag in tune with the Islamic ideology but at the same time find it okay for expressing one's love for the nation.[130] A revolutionary ideological group that resigns to its fate, dismissing itself from the leadership role and under the spell of the false propaganda of minorityism comes to believe that its role at the center stage is over, such a group, no doubt, is doomed to perish. During the last fifty years our failure to arrest the decline of the Ummah cannot be explained otherwise.

CONCLUSION

A people having a majestic history of global dominance and emotionally raised for a leadership role, for them, calling for the protection of their own minority rights is a phenomenon difficult to explain. Can a nation turn back on its own history while redefining itself in the new situation? Unfortunately this is precisely what has happened with the Muslim Indians. Today if the 250 million strong Muslim population appears as a hapless lot believing in its supposed minorityness and in the state propaganda that its history is over, it is mainly because this generation of Muslim Indians is completely bereft of the prophetic vision and unaware of its history. The

process of intellectual digression beset by the Fall of Delhi in 1857 eventually led the Ummah to the conversion of secularism. Unaware of the Islamic agenda and confused about their own identity today the Muslim Indians find themselves at a crossroad knowing not which direction to proceed. For the last fifty years they have been subject to an intense intellectual crisis and a dilemma of unknown magnitude resulting into a split personality. No doubt for various reasons they have embraced the new religion of secularism but they still feel very strongly that every thing is not okay with this new ideology. Practically they are devoted to the stability of the secular system but their restlessness increases with the increasing stability of the system and what it delivers to them. Rooted in the international outlook of Islam they do not feel enthusiastic about national festivals and symbols yet they feel compelled to be the first to express their love for nation lest they should be dubbed as anti-nationals. Islam as a living civilization has ceased to exist but it is still alive as a subject of academic and emotional interest. Today, the revolutionary message of Islam has been over shadowed by the liberal, modern, secular and traditional interpretations and the Muslim Indians have lost track of their history. But even in this state of intellectual diaspora, a little mention of the Islamic past or a weak voice of dissent creates strong doubts about the authenticity of this version of Islam. The religion of *Bhikshus*, of meek and submissive people, as Islam has come to be known today, has in fact nothing to do with the real Islamic message preached by Prophet Muhammed and still preserved in the Quarn and Sunnah. During the last fifty years the Muslim Indians have been oscillating between Islam and secular democracy. In effect they have divorced Islam in their social and political

life but emotionally they are in no mood to accept this unpleasant fact.

A people intellectually and emotionally raised up for a leadership role can, under social or political pressure, adapt to a peripheral position but in this case it cannot help. If Muslim Indians insist on their progress as a minority they need to give up their Islamic dream and emotionally cut off from Islam which so far they have been unable to do. The Jews, the Sikhs or other smaller groups doing well as minorities cannot be taken as the role models for Muslims as long as there survives an emotional linkage with Islam. It is a fact that despite a marked intellectual digression and living a life away from Islam it is deeply rooted somewhere in the Muslim mind that the solution to all their problems lies in returning to the pristine purity of Islam. To take a cue from Iqbal, the Ummah of the Hashemite prophet is unique in its composition and therefore no other nation can be regarded as equal to it, nor any formula for the uplift of other nations can equally be effective in the case of Muslims.

The last few years have witnessed the emergence of a new generation of Muslim apologists who trace the malaise of Muslims not in the oppressive, ruthless, secular democracy rather in Muslims' own inept attitude towards this mundane world. According to this view the Muslims have developed a habit of blaming the system for all their ills and do not take any initiative to help improve their economy, health and education. The root cause of the Muslim malaise lies, we are told, in the Muslim psyche itself. There might appear an iota of truth in this statement. But what has made the Muslim psyche so inept is a matter of debate. Living for almost half a century under the system of Kufr the Muslims have undergone a radical transformation. They are no more the same people

with a vision of the future or having any inkling of their majestic past. Unaware of their real identity they are a people without any dreams or vision. In their mad search for an identity at times they took others' dream as their own which turned out to be a nightmare. As for their ever-declining graph in different fields of life it basically mirrors the chaos and decline in the intellectual and emotional worlds. As long as the Muslims remain confused about their potential role in secular India they cannot be proactive citizens of this country nor can they be productive for the Islamic mission. Merely giving them goody advice that they must prove their worth and, like their predecessors must set good examples of high character conquering the heart of people with moral power is yet another way of creating some more confusion. The task of Islamic character building cannot be carried out in an un-Islamic system which Muslims have willingly given allegiance to. Those who expect a prophetic behavior or high morality from an Ummah living for so long right under the patronage of a Kufr system, not only show their ignorance of Islam but also of the very human nature and history.

During the last fifty years most of our attempts to understand the Muslim malaise have been focusing on the outer manifestations of the problem rather than getting to its root. A nation devoid of a vision or a dream of its own and surrounded by alien ideologies is an easy prey to false messiahs and pseudo-prophets wanting to take it for a ride. The last few decades are marked by the emergence of many organizations and individual reformers desperate to lead the Ummah on to a destination of their choice. Among them no doubt were people sincere at heart wanting to break the chains of political slavery. The signs of mild political revolts time and again; the birth of Muslim Majlise Mushawarat, the

emergence of Dr.Faridi's Muslim Majlis in Uttar Pradesh, the endorsement of a joint Muslim memorandum by some forty Muslim Members of Parliament during Mrs.Indira Gandhi's tenure and the recent debate advocating an independent Muslim polity are indications of the fact that the Ummah is still breathing its last. But the rebels of the system despite all their sincerity and devotion fail to realize that the root cause of their political slavery lies not so much in their social disunity but more so in the ideological confusion and intellectual apostasy. They ignore the fact that the social disunity is also a by-product of the ideological confusion itself. Among us are people known for their apolitical stance calling upon Muslims for a revival of their social life away from the intrusion of the political world. Some of them are working tirelessly for injecting a new life into the Ummah through educational programs, yet others believing that the revitalizing of our milli life is possible only by breaking the vicious circle of poverty, the supposed reason for our illiteracy. Some consider health and hygiene a matter of prime concern and take out a chariot journey for mass awareness while others are firm in their belief that the future of Muslim Indians lies in their commitment to Islamic Dawah alone. No doubt these issues have a direct bearing on our problems and any attempt to set things right on any of these fronts will naturally add some vigor to the dying Ummah of Islam. But we must not lose sight of the fact that even a successful implementation of all such programs mentioned above does not guarantee the emergence of an Ummah that can rightly be called the revolutionary Ummah of the last prophet capable of leading the modern world. The idea of *tadarruj* (gradualism), of gradual implementation of Islam, achieving a little for now while postponing more crucial issues for tomorrow, is a

method unknown in Islamic *weltanschauung*. Employing a reformist methodology to revolutionary projects is doomed to fail. A revolutionary change needs revolutionary action. Without dismantling the system of Kufr one cannot simply think of establishing a system of justice. If today Muslim Indians have put their hopes in a reformist approach sincerely believing that through educational and economic uplift of the community they will be able to create a new dawn, it is mainly because the Muslim mind does not operate any more within the Islamic framework. The Muslim thought has moved away from Islam and therefore Muslim intellectuals do not feel obliged to justify their standpoint on the basis of Islamic Shariah. Rather, they openly prefer their own wisdom to the methodology (manhaj) of the Quran and Sunnah. There is no denying the fact that most of our endeavors for uplifting the community, whether carried out by Muslim organizations or government agencies, are primarily intended to make some breathing space for Muslims within this suffocating system of Kufr. All such schemes are drawn considering the Muslims as a minority and are intended to uplift the community as a minority group so as to maintain its haplessness and 'minorityness' for ever. None of them conceive of the Ummah as a revolutionary group entrusted to a leadership role nor do they aim at reviving that great Ummah of the last Prophet. In fact they outrightly refuse to accept this special status of the Ummah and its ideological potential for such a role. It is therefore so obvious that all such schemes for community development cannot create a new dawn for Indian Muslims. Despite a clear bias of these schemes against revolutionary Islam, if some of us still think that these welfare schemes hold the future of Muslim Indians they are not only highly mistaken but are also guilty of

okaying a false Islamic agenda. It is high time for thinking Muslims to clear up the intellectual haze that makes it difficult for them to discover the Islamic agenda for which they are religiously committed and say a final good-bye to all such illusory schemes of welfare and development.

Our analysis of the problem finally leads us to conclude that the future of Muslim Indians lies in the rediscovery of Islamic agenda that is not so visible today due to the intellectual haze. We understand, it is no easy task. The Indian Muslims have ignored the Islamic agenda for so long that it no longer attracts their sympathy and concern. Instead, they have acquired a habit of working for non-Islamic ideals. It would not be that easy to make them realize that by doing so they are committing a sin no less than an intellectual apostasy. The demolition of the Babri Masjid no doubt has exposed the real face of secular democracy and in post-demolition India the Muslim's belief in secularism is already shaken. It won't be that difficult to create strong doubts about the viability of the system but restoring their belief in the viability of Islam that even today it has the potential to create a global system of justice on the debris of the Kufr system would certainly not be that easy to achieve. Devising a fresh methodology for change will much depend on our ability to travel backward in our intellectual history, to return to the pristine purity of Islam. The success of the new interpreters of Islam lies in their understanding of the modern world as well as in their ability to comprehend fully the early era of Islam, that is to say, taking an imaginative flight back in time and space so as to connect the two worlds on both the ideological and emotional planes. The fiqhi understanding of the Abbasi era cannot lead us in the modern world as it was not designed to meet the challenges of our time.

Today, Muslim Indians are passing through a transitory stage of their history. Their 'minorityness' cannot be taken as a permanent phenomenon. It is therefore incumbent on the fuqaha of our time that they, instead of creating a new fiqh for a Muslim minority situation, concentrate their efforts around the basic question as how to make Islam the agenda for the 21st century India, rather for the entire globe. It would be a futile exercise to create a permanent fiqh for an impermanent or transitory situation. The basic question that holds promise of a future is about the viability of a revolutionary methodology. Making Islam the agenda for our time is possible only through a rediscovery of Islamic Thought transcending all the barriers of time and space, putting aside the unnecessary fiqhi garbage that we have accumulated in the course of our centuries long intellectual journey. Without a proper reconstruction of Islamic thought and for that matter a deconstruction of secularized Islam, no scheme for community development or movement for social reform can be effective. This is precisely the crux of the problem, the root cause of all our ills which has set the Muslim Ummah in India and elsewhere on to an intellectual diaspora. Revolutions start in minds. It is basically a thinking process. Believing in their supposed 'minorityness', the Muslim Indians are living in psychological concentration camps of their own making. As long as they do not break this psychological shell they will not be able to resume the Islamic way of life or reinstate themselves to the position of authority and guidance.

NOTES & REFERENCES

1. Muhammad Iqbal, "Khilafate Islamia" in *Fikre Iqbal*, Hyderabad, 1944, pp. 57-8; Also see, *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, London, 1951, p. 15.
   Hence onward referred to only as *The Reconstruction*.
2. It is a farce to consider Muslims, a community of 250 million strong population, as a minority. Theodore P. Wright Jr. quotes a Hindu writer as saying 'it is taken for granted that Hindus are a majority ... but to say so is totally wrong. The vast mass of people that are called Hindus are a vast congeries of sub-caste minorities ... whereas the Muslims form the actual majority'.
   Theodore P. Wright, Jr. 'The Ethnic numbers game in India: Hindu Muslim Conflicts over Conversion, Family Planning, Migration and the Census', William McCrady (ed.), *Culture Ethnicity and Identity*, New York, 1983, p. 412.
   The recent years have witnessed a revolt against the constitutional definition of the term 'Hindu' that which make the Hindus an artificial majority. For example, the emergence of the Dalits on the political scene have made them confident enough that they are not a part of the Hindu society and so the Sikhs, the Jains and other faith groups are asserting their identity more vigorously than ever before.
3. It has reference to the Quranic verse: 'How often a small group overcame a mighty host by Allah's Leave'. (Al-Baqarah:249)
4. It is difficult to ascertain the true numerical strength of Indian Muslims. The issue has been a complicated one even before the partition. The Congressite Muslims, to emphasize their point that even in partitioned India Muslims would constitute significantly huge number, no less than in Pakistan, that their

migration would only be a dream and hence, according to them, the creation of Pakistan was no solution to some fifty percent Muslims who will be forced to stay in Hindu India. While on the other hand Muslim League down played the Muslim population that was to fall in Hindu India. According to the Congressite Muslims an estimated population of Muslims in future secular India was to fall somewhere between 40 to 45 million while the Muslim League would bring it down as less as 20 million. It is on record that Mr. Jinnah while addressing a session of Muslim Student's Federation at Kanpur had spoken of the twenty million Muslims whom he was more than willing to sacrifice in order to free the 70 million Muslims of future Pakistan. Quoted by Asar bin Yahya Ansari in *Maulana Azad Ek Seyasi Dairy*, Dhauliya, 1982, p.304.

5. Quoted by Aziz Ahmad in *Studies in Islamic Culture in the Indian Environment*, Oxford, 1964, p.4. Hence onward referred to only as *Studies*.
6. op. cit. p. 5.
7. Loc. cit.
8. op. cit. p. 6.
9. Loc. cit.
10. op. cit. p. 7.
11. Loc. cit.
12. op. cit. p. 8.
13. op. cit. p. 10
14. *Fatawa Aalamgiri*, a monumental work of the Hanafite Fiqh, was compiled in an age when the institution of the Khilafah was no more central to the Islamic thought and it was not considered as to be the cognizable center of the Ummah. The essential criteria for a land to be declared as a Darul Islam was the implementation of the *Shariah* and the ruler being a Muslim. Later, the *Shariah* alone became the sole criteria for making a

land Darul Islam as one finds in the famous Fatwa of Shah Abdul Aziz who declaring India still Darul Islam under the Marathas pronounced it Darul Harab under the British. One has to understand these conflicting rulings in the light of the British interference in Islamic legal system. The Marathas too, no doubt, had rolled back the Shariah courts but their emergence on the scene was considered only as a temporary phenomenon. The emergence of the British India was not a case of revolt rather it was the establishment of another empire on the ruins of Muslim India. This might be another reason why Shah Abdul Aziz distinguishes between the two ruling systems.

For a detailed discussion on the topic see: *Fatawa Azizia* (Urdu) Kanpur, n.d. pp. 35-37.

15. Quoted by Sir Syed Ahmad Khan in *Tahzeebul Akhlaque*, ii, (collected reprint), Lahore, 1896, p. 402.
16. Shibli Nomani, who by that time had not come under the spell of Al-Afghani, wrote an article at the behest of Sir Syed in which he argued that the true Khilafah ended with the first four Caliphs and even in the sense of a temporal leadership of Muslims the Khilafah was the privilege of the Qurayash only. For further detail see, *Maqalate Shibli*, Azamgarh, 1930-34, pp. 167-74.
17. Sir Syed Ahmad Khan, *Safar Nama-e-Punjab*, p. 117.
18. Sir Syed Ahmad Khan, *Mokammal Majmooa Lectures*, ed. Muhammad Emaduddin Gujrati, Lahore, 1900, p. 374. Hence onward referred to only as *Lectures*.

    On yet another occasion he wrote: 'It is our religious duty to be faithful to the British government and not to indulge in anything — both in words and deed — that may cast a shadow of doubt on our loyalty to the British'. In Sir Syed Ahmad Khan, *Aakhiri Mazameen*, ed. Emaduddin Gujrati, Lahore,

1898, p. 101.

19. op. cit., pp. 32-33, Also see *The Truth about Khilafat*, Lahore, 1916.
20. op. cit., p. 50.
21. Sir Syed Ahmad Khan, *Loyal Mohammadans of India*, vol.ii, 1860, p.16; Also see *Aakhiri Mazameen*, op. cit. p.113.
22. Jamaluddin Al-Afghani in *Al-Urwatul Wusqa*, quoted by Aziz Ahmad in *Studies*, p.62.
23. Quoted by Prof. Rasheed Ahmad in *Musalmano ke Seyasi Afkar*, Lahore, pp. 290-91.
24. According to Afghani, the division of the Darul Islam was instrumental in the fragmentation of Islamic thought. As the *Ulema* of various lands had lost contact this resulted in the development of a local version of Islam, completely unaware of the developments in other parts of the Muslim world. This division also led to the emergence of various schisms and heresies. Afghani therefore proposed the establishment of various regional centers of Islam and these regional centers to be affiliated to a universal center located in the holy land where the *Ulema* could meet to develop a consensus on issues of vital importance.
25. Shibli Nomani, *Ilmul Kalam*, Azamgarh, 1922, pp. 3-4, 31-32.
26. op. cit., pp. 161-2.
27. Sir Syed Ahmad Khan, *Lectures*, op. cit. p. 24.
28. *Aligarh Institute Gazatte*, 12 May 1871, p. 296.
29. Sir Syed Ahmed Khan, *Lectures*, op.cit., p.573; Also see, Khuda Bakhsh whose support to the British conquest is so whole-hearted that he feels honored in being a subject of the British empire. Khuda Baksh, *Essays: Indian and Islamic*, London, 1912, pp. 213, 215, 227.
30. op. cit., pp. 572-3.
31. Chiragh Ali, 'Islam and change' from *The Proposed Political*

Legal and Social Reforms under Moslem Rule in *Islam in Transition: Muslim Perspectives*, ed. John J. Donohue John L. Esposito, Oxford New York 1982, pp. 44-7. Hence onward referred to only as *Transition*.

32. To prove this point Chiragh Ali has quoted the famous tradition from Sahih Muslim that while the Prophet was coming to Medina he saw certain persons fecundating date trees. He advised them not to do so. They acted accordingly, and the yield was meager that year. When it was reported to him the prophet said, 'He was merely a man. What he instructed them in their religion they must take, but when he ventured his opinion in other matters he was only a man". Chiragh Ali's understanding of this tradition places the entire social life outside Islamic preview. *Transition*, pp. 44-47.
33. Muhsinul Mulk, *Causes of the Decline of the Mohammadam Nation*, Bombay, 1891, quoted by W.C. Smith in *Modern Islam in India: A Social Analysis*, Lahore, 1943, p.25.
34. S. Khuda Baksh, *Essays: Indian and Islamic*, London, 1912, p.215.
35. An interesting document of the new Islam by some Mustafa Khan entitled as *An Apology for the New Light* (1891) was published by the Aligarh School. The book reads like a manifesto of the new Islam with much in the spirit of adjustment rather than a creative thinking.
36. Syed Amir Ali, *The Spirit of Islam*, 1961, p. 178; *The Ethics of Islam*, Calcutta, 1893, pp. 4-26
37. Mustafa Khan, op.cit. p.12.
38. Chiragh Ali, in *Transition*, p. 47
39. Shah Waliullah, *Fauzul Harmain*, Karachi, p. 233.
40. Maulana Mohammad Ali, "Justice to Islam and Turkey" in *Transition*, op. cit. p. 52.
41. Loc.cit.

42. Chiragh Ali, in *Transition*, op.cit., p. 47.
43. Amir Ali, *The Spirit of Islam*, London,1922, p.172.
44. op.cit., p.1.
45. op.cit., p. 21.
46. op.cit., p. 248.
47. See Iqbal's famous poem 'Saqi Nama'.
48. If the revival of traditional Islamic institutions is not possible, believes Iqbal, new institutions can be created and employed for an Islamic renaissance. As the revival of the Ummah under one single Imam is no more a workable idea in Iqbal, he therefore calls for the adoption of modern institutions instead of reviving the age-old Khilafah: 'the universal leadership of the Ummah has failed in practice. It was a workable idea when the empire of Islam was intact ... the idea has ceased to be operative and cannot work as a living factor in the organization of modern Islam'. *The Reconstruction*, op. cit., p. 149.
49. Muhammad Iqbal, *Tashkeel Jadeed Elahiyate Islamia* (Urdu), tr. Nazeer Neyazi, Lahore, 1994, p. 16.
50. *Al-Quran*, 35:1.
51. *Al-Quran*, 29:19.
52. Quoted by Rashid Shaz, in *Islamic Unity: Illusion and Reality*, Conference paper, The Seventh International Conference of World Assembly of Muslim Youth, Riyadh, p.18
53. Muhammed Iqbal, *The Reconstruction*, op.cit., p.149
54. Ibid., p.150.
55. Ibid., pp.151-152.
56. Muhammed Iqbal, Presidential Address at the annual session of the Muslim League at Allahabad in 1930, (*Struggle for Freedom*, 1857-1947), Karachi, 1958, Appendix iv, 13.
57. Iqbal, otherwise a man of vision and understanding, failed to suggest a purely Islamic model on which the Ummah had to be revived. In a letter to Jinnah, written from his deathbed, he

suggested that the only solution to the Muslim problem was the creation of an Independent Muslim nation state. He wrote: 'In the larger interest of Muslim survival in India, Muslim minorities in Hindu majority provinces should sacrifice their own interests for the creation of a separate Muslim State in the zones of Muslim majority.'

Letters of Iqbal to Jinnah (*Struggle for Freedom*, Appendix V,) 35.

58. Having visualized the practical difficulties in the revival of Islamic Khilfah Iqbal took refuge in Muslim multi-nationalism. The Ka'ba which comes to Iqbal as the possible 'Cognizable Centre' for the Ummah, the basis on which the global of Ummah of Islam can be reorganized, remains only a potential Centre, a utopian dream. In practical sphere he entirely gives up this idea creating a local cognizable center, a regional nucleus, a new Ka'ba for Muslims of the subcontinent called Pakistan. For a detailed discussion on the topic see his article, 'Jughrafiaee Hudood Aur Musalman' in *Mazameen-e-Iqbal*, Hyderabad Deccan, 1360 A.H.
59. For a better exposition of Iqbal's views on the topic see *Rumooze Bekhudi*.
60. Iqbal, *Presidential Address*, op. cit. pp. 16-17.
61. Abul Kalam Azad, *Khutbat*, Lahore, 1944, 42-44.
62. Amir Ali, *Spirit*, op. cit., p. 403.
63. Obaidullah Sindhi, a prominent deobandi scholar, also called for an independent Muslim nation state that has to be a future laboratory for what he called 'Waliullahi Socialism'. To achieve this objective he even founded an organization called 'Yamuna Narbada Sindh Sagar Party'. *Khutbat*, pp. 180-1, 236-41.
64. The search for a just economic system took Maulana Hifzur Rahman Seharwi to Marxism which he considered yet another variety of Islamic socialism, a semblance of which he found in

Shah Waliullah's thought. See, *Islam ka Eqtesadi Nezam*, Delhi, 1942, pp. 1-5.

65. See, Presidential Address, Jamiatul Ulema-e-Hind, Delhi, 1920, Vol.I, pp. 191-2.
66. Soon after partition, both Abul Kalam Azad and Husain Ahmad Madni realized that their political standpoint have brought them to a blind alley. Their tirade against the British was due to this historical fact that India was a Darul Islam under British occupation. And as Muslims they considered it their duty to fight for the liberation of the Darul Islam. Hence to them freedom struggle was a religious obligation. However, they were slow to realize that the in future India non-Muslims will be in a decisive and dominant position and in no way they will be in a position to call it Darul Islam again. Madni, in one of his letters, reflects on this future fear thus: 'In free-India Hindus and Muslims would be co-workers. This new society would not be modeled along the concept of an Islamic state but still Muslims would play on effective role'. *Maktubat*, 1956, pp. 20-21, pp. 45-47.
67. Quoted by A.K.Barohi in *Fundamental Law of Pakistan*, First edition, 1958, p.938
68. For a detailed view of the issue see Rashid Shaz, *Hindustani Musalman: Ayyam-e-Gumgashta ke Pachas Baras*, (Urdu) Delhi, 1999, pp. 18-19. Hence on ward referred to only as *Ayyam Gumgashta*.
69. *Census of India*, 1941, Delhi, 1943.
70. Kingsley Davis, *The Population of India and Pakistan*, (Chapter 20 'Population and Partition') Princeton, 1951.
71. B.R. Ambedkar, *Pakistan or the Partition of India*, Bombay, 1946, p. 331.
72. Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, 'Delhi ke Musalmano se Khitab', in *Imamul Hind*, (ed.) Sayida Sayyedain Hameed, Delhi, 1990,

p. 235.

73. On 17th April 1949 at an all India session of the *Jamiatul Ulema* held in Lucknow, Maulana Hifzur Rahman put forward a resolution saying that hence onward the Jamiat was ceased to exist as a political organization and would limit itself to religious and cultural activities only. Quoted in *Seyasi Dairy*, p. 242, Also see, monthly *Burhan* Urdu monthly of Nadwatul Musannefin Delhi, April, 1948, p. 134.
74. Maulana Abullais Islahi Nadvi, *Musalmanane Hind ka Aayenda ka Layeha-e-Amal*, Rampur.
75. Maulana Mohammad Manzoor Nomani, monthly *Al-Furqan*, Lucknow, April, 1950, vol. 17.
76. Muhammad Mujeeb, *Hindustani Musalman*, (Urdu) tr. Muhammad Mehdi, Delhi 1998, p. 807.
77. Syed Abid Husain, *Qaumi Tahzeeb ka Masela*, Aligarh 1955, pp. 306-7.
78. Raj Mohan Gandhi, *Muslim Afkar*, (tr.) Muhammad Faruq Qureshi, Lahore, 1996, p. 418.
79. A.A.A. Fyzee, *A Modern Approach to Islam*, Asia Publishing House, 1963, p.107.
80. Loc. cit.
81. op. cit. p. 112.
82. Monthly *Burhan*, Delhi, p. 2.
83. Ibid. p. 3.
84. During 1998 general parliamentary elections, the Milli Parliament in collaboration with the Khilafat Party issued a joint appeal to Muslims. The appeal called upon Muslims not to take part in the election process as there was no Muslim option available for them. In Islam, it argued, the authority of a non-Muslim Uolul Amr (ruler) is not acceptable nor are we Muslims allowed to work for a non-Muslim political agenda hence there is no other course left for Muslims but to stay away

from the polling booths. In support of this stand the appeal quoted two verses from the Quran; 'And Allah does not allow disbelievers to have authority over Muslims' (Al-Nisa, 141) and 'Let not the Believers take for friends or helpers Unbelievers rather than Believers: if any do that, in nothing will there be help from Allah, except by way of precaution, that ye may guard yourselves from them. (Aal-e-Imran, 28)

As this appeal had created a furor among Delhi Muslims, the press approached major Muslim organizations to have a first hand account of their reaction. The Muslim leaders or chief of Muslim organizations contacted, completely ignored the Quranic arguments that the appeal had put forward, instead they justified their participation in elections or support for a party of their choice on the basis of constitutional provisions. For example, Qazi Mujahidul Islam, the chief of Milli Council and Vice-president of Muslim personal Law Board said that the right to vote is our constitutional and democratic right hence we must use it. Similar arguments were put forward by Amir Jamat-e-Islami Maulana Sirajul Hasan and Maulana Abdul Wahab Khilji of Jamiat Ahl-e-Hadith.

See, *Rashtriya Sahara*, (Urdu daily), 28 Aug. 1998.

85. Monthly *Burhan*, January 1963, p. 5.
86. See, S. Gopal, (ed.), Jawaharlal Nehru: *An Anthology (Oxford University Press: Delhi)*, 1980, p. 330.
87. See, Raghawan Iyer (ed.), The Moral and Political Writings of Mahatma Gandhi, vol. 1: Civilization, Politics, and Religion (Clarendon Press: Oxford), 1986, p. 391.
88. Quoted by Justice Ahmadi on p. 46 S.R. Bommai v. Union of India Constitution, Art. 356. Judgment of the Supreme Court of India by a Special Bench of five judges along with written submissions of Counsels, SCA 1994 (2), Scale vol. II, no. 1 14-20 March.

89. Bernad Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey* (Oxford University Press: London), 1968, pp. 239-93.
90. As generally understood Hinduism is not a religion rather a way of life, a cultural legacy. The ultimate goal of Hinduism is to liberate the individual from an unending cycle of birth and rebirth. The methodology to achieve this target has been a matter of debate among the Hindus however there has been no disagreement about the goal itself. In the Hindu word-view, the only way for an individual to attain salvation or *Moksha* is to get rid of the materiel possessions and take a complete renunciation from this world. The Judiciary has also accepted this definition of Hinduism as the only agreed definition of this complex religion.
91. Rashid Shaz, *Ayyame Gumgashta*, p. 48.
92. Ibid. pp. 46-47.
93. Quoted in *Milli Times International*, New Delhi, Sept. 1999, vol. 6. No. 3. P. 4.
94. *Constitution of India.*
95. Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments v. Lakshmindra, 1954, Supreme Court Appeals, pp. 431-2.
96. Constituent Assembly Debates, vol. 7, p. 781
97. A.I.R., 1953, Bombay, p. 242.
98. For example, the Arabic proverb *Hubbul Watan Hubbul Imam* (i.e. Love for one's land is love for religion) became the basis for misguided nationalism and uncalled for patriotism. Similarly, another Arabic proverb *Mala Yudrak Kullahu La Yatruk Jullahu* (If you can't get all don't leave the little) was taken as an *Usool* to justify the lame concept of *Shariah* which has now confined to the Muslim Personal Law only. So was the extraordinary popularity of the concept of *Ahwanul Baliyyatain*, the supposed *fiqhi* methodology that became a guiding principle not only for extreme emergencies but more so for the

ordinary situations.

99. *Al-Haram*, Meerut, special issue on Maulana Husain Ahmad Madani, p. 114.
100. Ibid. p. 17.
101. Sehroza *Al-Insaf*, Allahabad, 5 March, 1949.
102. Al-Haram, Meerut, op. cit. p. 114.
103. Syed Abul Hasan Ali Nadvi, *Karvan-e-Zindagi*, Lucknow, vol.V, pp. 197-8.
104. Quoted by weekly *Naqeeb*, Patna.
105. Minersville School District v. Gobitis, 1940, 310 US, p. 586, and West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 1943, 319 US, p. 624.
106. *Al-Jamiat*, 24 March, 1948, Reproduced in Sehroza Dawat, special issue on 'Muslim Problems', 28 Sept. 2000.
107. Loc. cit.
108. See Editorial, monthly *Burhan*, Delhi, January 1949, p. 3.
109. See, Monthly *Burhan*, March 1948, pp. 65-66.
110. Ibid. p. 70.

In order to popularize the secular ideologies among Muslims Gandhi projected them as part of the Islamic belief system. He lauded the teachings of Prophet Muhammad and showered generous words of appreciation on Abu Bakr and Umar, the first and second Caliphs of Islam. He even selected portions from the Quran for his *Prarthna Sabha* (Prayer Meetings) along with other religious books. Such moves became instrumental in softening the Muslim attitude towards Gandhian ideology. Firstly, Muslim's belief in the finality of the Islamic message gradually waned. Islam became like one of many other religions. Secondly, Gandhi attempted to change the Islamic worldview by placing alien concepts within the Islamic framework. In his journal *Harijan* published on 11 Nov. 1939 he wrote that nonviolence is not only a political strategy,

rather it is the very essence of Islam. In support of this view he wrongly drew inferences from the Quran and Sunnah and went to the extent of pointing out some contradictions between the Islamic teachings and the actual practice of the holy Prophet.

The Gandhian interpretation of Islam eventually provoked the traditional *Ulema* to write refutations. One such refutation appeared in monthly *Burhan* of January 1940 by Maulana Hifzur Rahman, a well-known Congressite Aalim. The Maulana took a serious note of the view that nonviolence was the eventual destination of Islamic society, however, he opined that in the given situation it was the only viable strategy. A close look at the debate that was going on in various Urdu journals of the time clearly show that though the emotional attachment of Muslims with Islam and its prophet made it impossible for them to shun the Islamic ideals, in practical sphere they had very much become the followers of Gandhi. Later, in post-independence India, when Syed Abul Hasan Ali Nadvi considered nonviolence essential for the stability of the country and urged all countrymen to follow this Gandhian principle in letter and spirit, he too was propagating this idea not as the essence of Islamic message but only as a practical alternative. Muslims in general might not have taken nonviolence as a part of Islam, however, its acceptance as a long-standing practical alternative purged its alien-ness from the Muslim mind.

Muslims never accepted Gandhi as an authentic interpreter of Islam. Nevertheless, Gandhi had an extraordinary success in bringing Islam to the level of other religions. Later Muslims witnessed strange scenes of Quranic recitations, along with other religious books, beside the funeral pyre of non-Muslim dignitaries. And such disgusting scenes did not provoke any

reaction from them.

111. Loc. cit.
112. Daily *Al-Jamiat* Delhi, Shaikhul Islam Nambar, 2nd reprint, 10 July 1998, p. 48.
113. Daily Qawmi Awaz, New Delhi, September 1966, quoted in *Ayyame Gumgashta*, op. cit. p. 57.
114. See, Editorial monthly *Burhan*, op. cit. Sept. 1951, pp. 2-3.
115. For more detailed discussion on the topic see, Sayeed Ahmad Akbar Aabadi, Hindustan ki Sharei Haisiyat
116. See editorial monthly *Burhan*, op. cit. Sept. 1951, p. 4.
117. See, Fazlul Bari's letter to Dr. Zafrul Islam Khan in *Muslim and Arab Perspectives*. Also see, Resolutions adopted in a seminar on "Muslims in non-Islamic system" organized by Majlise Tameer Millat Hyderabad, June 2000.
118. Sehroza *Dawat*, Delhi, 10 Dec. 1999, Also quoted in monthly *Allah ki Pukar*, New Delhi, December 1999, p. 65.
119. *Burhan*, op. cit. Jan. 1963.
120. Loc. cit.
121. Quoted by Rashid Shaz in *Ayyame Gumgashta*, op. cit. p. 151.
122. Camera photos of these appeals have been reproduced in *Ayyame Gumgashta* from *Dawat* and *Qaumi Awaz*, pp. 153 & 155.
123. Reference has already been made to the Milli parliament's appeal to boycott the polls and the Muslim leadership's reaction to this appeal. In note 84 we have explained how the *Ulema* instead of basing their judgement on the *Shariah* preferred to find justification for their views in the Constitution. *Rashtriya Sahara* Urdu daily, 28 Aug. 1998.
124. Maulana Qari Muhammed Tayyab, *Islami Aazadi ka Mokammal Programme*, Presidential Address, Bombay, 1946. Quoted in *Ayyame Gumgashta*, op. cit., p.40.
125. Maulana Syed Abul Hasan Ali Nadvi, Address to the Personal

Law Board session, Delhi, 25 April, 1998, reproduced in *Tameere Hayat*, Lucknow, 10 May, 1998, p.31.

126. Syed Abul Hasan Ali Nadvi, Address to the Centennial Celebrations at Deoband, 1950, quoted in *Bange Dara*, Mufakkire Islam Abul Hasan Ali Nadvi Number, Lucknow, May-July, 2000, p. 64
127. *Al-Jamiat*, 24 October, 1960.
128. *Al-Furqan*, May 1967.
129. *Illustrated Weekly*, 4 Dec.1983, quoted by Rashid Shaz in *Ayyame Gumgashta*, op. cit., pp. 80-81.
130. Resolutions adopted at the Majlise Tameere Millat Seminar, reproduced in monthly *Afkar-e-Milli*, New Delhi, August 2000.

APPENDIX I

(The text of the Quranic verses that the author had in mind in course of his aualysis of the subject)

اَفَتُؤمِنُوْنَ بِبَعْضِ الْكِتَابِ وَتَكْفُرُوْنَ بِبَعْضٍ ۚ فَمَا جَزَآءُ مَنْ يَّفْعَلُ ذَالِكَ مِنْكُمْ اِلَّا خِزْىٌ فِى الْحَيٰوةِ الدُّنْيَا ۚ وَيَوْمَ الْقِيَامَةِ يُرَدُّوْنَ اِلٰى اَشَدِّ الْعَذَابِ ۗ وَمَا اللّٰهُ بِغَافِلٍ عَمَّا تَعْمَلُوْنَ.

(البقره: ٨٥)

Then is it only a part of the Book that ye believe in, and do ye reject the rest? But what is the reward for those among you who behave like this but disgrace in this life? And on the Day of Judgment they shall be consigned to the most grievous penalty. For Allah is not unmindful of what ye do.

وَلْتَكُنْ مِّنْكُمْ اُمَّةٌ يَّدْعُوْنَ اِلَى الْخَيْرِ وَيَاْمُرُوْنَ بِالْمَعْرُوْفِ وَيَنْهَوْنَ عَنِ الْمُنْكَرِ وَاُولٰٓئِكَ هُمُ الْمُفْلِحُوْنَ. (آل عمران: ١٠٤)

Let there arise out of you a band of people inviting to all that is good, enjoining what is right, and forbidding what is wrong: they are the ones to attain felicity.

وَمَنْ يَّبْتَغِ غَيْرَ الْاِسْلَامِ دِيْناً فَلَنْ يُّقْبَلَ مِنْهُ ۚ وَهُوَ فِى الْاٰخِرَةِ مِنَ الْخٰسِرِيْنَ. (آل عمران: ٨٥)

If anyone desires a religion other than Islam (submission to Allah) never will it be accepted of him; and in the Hereafter he will be in the ranks of those who have lost (all spiritual good).

قُلْ اِنْ كُنْتُمْ تُحِبُّوْنَ اللّٰهَ فَاتَّبِعُوْنِىْ يُحْبِبْكُمُ اللّٰهُ وَيَغْفِرْ لَكُمْ ذُنُوْبَكُمْ وَاللّٰهُ غَفُوْرٌ رَّحِيْمٌ.

(آل عمران: ٣١)

Say: "If ye do love Allah, follow me: Allah will love you and forgive you your sins; for Allah is Oft-Forgiving, Most Merciful."

فَلَا وَرَبِّكَ لَايُؤْمِنُوْنَ حَتّٰى يُحَكِّمُوْكَ فِيْمَا شَجَرَ بَيْنَهُمْ ثُمَّ لَايَجِدُوْا فِىْٓ اَنْفُسِهِمْ حَرَجاً مِّمَّا قَضَيْتَ وَيُسَلِّمُوْا تَسْلِيْماً. (النساء: ٦٥)

But no, by thy Lord, they can have no (real) Faith, until they make thee judge in all disputes between them, and find in their souls no resistance

against thy decisionsbut accept them with the fullest conviction.

يَـٰٓأَيُّهَا الَّذِيْنَ آمَنُوٓا اَطِيْعُوا اللّٰهَ وَاَطِيْعُوا الرَّسُوْلَ وَاُوْلِى الْاَمْرِ مِنْكُمْ ۚ فَاِنْ تَنَازَعْتُمْ فِىْ شَىْءٍ فَرُدُّوْهُ اِلَى اللّٰهِ وَالرَّسُوْلِ اِنْ كُنْتُمْ تُؤْمِنُوْنَ بِاللّٰهِ وَالْيَوْمِ الْآخِرِ ۗ ذَالِكَ خَيْرٌ وَّاَحْسَنُ تَاْوِيْلاً.

(النساء: ٥٩)

O ye who believe! obey Allah, and obey the Messenger, and those charged with authority among you, If ye differ in anything among yourselves, refer it to Allah and His Messenger, if ye do believe in Allah and the Last Day: that is best, and most suitable for final determination.

وَلَنْ يَّجْعَلَ اللّٰهُ لِلْكَافِرِيْنَ عَلَى الْمُؤْمِنِيْنَ سَبِيْلاً. (النساء: ١٤١)

And never will Allah grant to the Unbelievers a way (to triumph) over the Believers.

وَمَنْ لَّمْ يَحْكُمْ بِمَآ اَنْزَلَ اللّٰهُ فَاُوْلٰٓئِكَ هُمُ الْكَافِرُوْنَ. (المائده: ٤٤)

If any do fail to judge by (the light of) what Allah hath revealed, they are (no better than) Unbelievers.

وَاَنْزَلْنَآ اِلَيْكَ الْكِتَابَ بِالْحَقِّ مُصَدِّقاً لِّمَا بَيْنَ يَدَيْهِ مِنَ الْكِتَابِ وَمُهَيْمِناً عَلَيْهِ فَاحْكُمْ بَيْنَهُمْ بِمَآ اَنْزَلَ اللّٰهُ وَلَاتَتَّبِعْ اَهْوَآءَهُمْ عَمَّا جَآءَكَ مِنَ الْحَقِّ ۗ لِكُلٍّ جَعَلْنَا مِنْكُمْ شِرْعَةً وَّمِنْهَاجاً ۗ وَلَوْ شَآءَ اللّٰهُ لَجَعَلَكُمْ اُمَّةً وَّاحِدَةً وَّلٰكِنْ لِّيَبْلُوَكُمْ فِىْ مَآ آتَاكُمْ فَاسْتَبِقُوا الْخَيْرَاتِ ۗ اِلَى اللّٰهِ مَرْجِعُكُمْ جَمِيْعاً فَيُنَبِّئُكُمْ بِمَا كُنْتُمْ فِيْهِ تَخْتَلِفُوْنَ. (المائده: ٤٨)

To thee We sent the Scripture in truth, confirming the Scripture that came before it and guarding it in safety: so judge between them by what Allah hath revealed, and follow not their vain desires, diverging from the Truth that hath come to thee. To each among you have We prescribed a Law and an Open Way. If Allah had so willed, He would have made you a single People, but (His plan is) to test you in what He hath given you; so strive as in a race in all virtues. The goal of you all is to Allah; it is He that will show you the truth of the matters in which ye dispute;

وَاَنِ احْكُمْ بَيْنَهُمْ بِمَآ اَنْزَلَ اللّٰهُ وَلَاتَتَّبِعْ اَهْوَآءَهُمْ وَاحْذَرْهُمْ اَنْ يَّفْتِنُوْكَ عَنْ بَعْضِ مَآ اَنْزَلَ اللّٰهُ اِلَيْكَ ۗ فَاِنْ تَوَلَّوْا فَاعْلَمْ اَنَّمَا يُرِيْدُ اللّٰهُ اَنْ يُّصِيْبَهُمْ بِبَعْضِ ذُنُوْبِهِمْ ۗ وَاِنَّ كَثِيْراً مِّنَ النَّاسِ لَفٰسِقُوْنَ. (المائده: ٤٩)

And this (He commands) judge thou between them by what Allah hath revealed, and follow not their vain desires, but beware of them lest they beguile thee from any of that (teaching) which Allah hath sent down to thee. And if they turn away, be assured that for some of their crimes it is Allah's purpose to punish them. And truly most men are rebellious.

اَلْيَوْمَ اَكْمَلْتُ لَكُمْ دِيْنَكُمْ وَاَتْمَمْتُ عَلَيْكُمْ نِعْمَتِيْ وَرَضِيْتُ لَكُمُ الْاِسْلَامَ دِيْنًا (المائده: ٣)

This day have I perfected your religion for you, completed My favour upon you, and have chosen for you Islam as your religion.

وَلَقَدْ كُذِّبَتْ رُسُلٌ مِّنْ قَبْلِكَ فَصَبَرُوْا عَلٰى مَا كُذِّبُوْا وَاُوْذُوْا حَتّٰى اَتَاهُمْ نَصْرُنَا ۚ وَلَا مُبَدِّلَ لِكَلِمٰتِ اللّٰهِ ۚ وَلَقَدْ جَآءَكَ مِنْ نَّبَاِئِ الْمُرْسَلِيْنَ. (الانعام: ٣٤)

Rejected were the Messengers before thee: with patience and constancy they bore their rejection and their wrongs, until Our aid did reach them: there is none that can alter the Words (and Decrees) of Allah. Already hast thou received some account of those Messengers.

فَاصْدَعْ بِمَا تُؤْمَرُ وَاَعْرِضْ عَنِ الْمُشْرِكِيْنَ. (الحجر: ٩٤)

Therefore expound openly what thou art commanded, and turn away from those who join false gods with Allah.

وَيَوْمَ نَبْعَثُ فِيْ كُلِّ اُمَّةٍ شَهِيْدًا عَلَيْهِمْ مِّنْ اَنْفُسِهِمْ وَجِئْنَا بِكَ شَهِيْدًا عَلٰى هٰٓؤُلَآءِ ۚ وَنَزَّلْنَا عَلَيْكَ الْكِتَابَ تِبْيَانًا لِّكُلِّ شَيْءٍ وَّهُدًى وَّرَحْمَةً وَّبُشْرٰى لِلْمُسْلِمِيْنَ. (النحل: ٨٩)

One day We shall raise from all Peoples a witness against them, from amongst themselves: and We shall bring thee as a witness against these (thy people): and We have sent down to thee a Book explaining all things, a Guide, a Mercy, and Glad Tidings to Muslims.

لَقَدْ كَانَ لَكُمْ فِيْ رَسُوْلِ اللّٰهِ اُسْوَةٌ حَسَنَةٌ لِّمَنْ كَانَ يَرْجُوا اللّٰهَ وَالْيَوْمَ الْاٰخِرَ وَذَكَرَ اللّٰهَ كَثِيْرًا. (الاحزاب: ٢١)

Ye have indeed in the Messenger of Allah a beautiful pattern (of conduct) for any one whose hope is in Allah and the Final Day, and who engages much in the praise of Allah.

وَمَا كَانَ لِمُؤْمِنٍ وَّلَا مُؤْمِنَةٍ اِذَا قَضَى اللّٰهُ وَرَسُوْلُهٗ اَمْرًا اَنْ يَّكُوْنَ لَهُمُ الْخِيَرَةُ مِنْ اَمْرِهِمْ ۗ

وَمَنْ يَّعْصِ اللّٰهَ وَرَسُوْلَهٗ فَقَدْ ضَلَّ ضَلٰلاً مُّبِيْناً. (الاحزاب: ٣٦)

It is not fitting for a Believer, man or woman, when a matter has been decided by Allah and His Messenger, to have any option about their decisionif anyone disobeys Allah and His Messenger, he is indeed on a clearly wrong Path.

مَآ اَفَآءَ اللّٰهُ عَلٰى رَسُوْلِهٖ مِنْ اَهْلِ الْقُرٰى فَلِلّٰهِ وَلِلرَّسُوْلِ وَلِذِى الْقُرْبٰى وَالْيَتَامٰى وَالْمَسَاكِيْنِ وَابْنِ السَّبِيْلِ ۙ كَىْ لَا يَكُوْنَ دُوْلَةً ۢ بَيْنَ الْاَغْنِيَآءِ مِنْكُمْ ؕ وَمَآ آتَاكُمُ الرَّسُوْلُ فَخُذُوْهُ ۚ وَمَا نَهٰكُمْ عَنْهُ فَانْتَهُوْا ۚ وَاتَّقُوا اللّٰهَ ؕ اِنَّ اللّٰهَ شَدِيْدُ الْعِقَابِ. (الحشر: ٧)

What Allah has bestowed on His Messenger (and taken away) from the people of the townships, belongs to Allah, to His Messenger and to kindred and orphans,the needy and the wayfarer; in order that it may not (merely) make a circuit between the wealthy among you. So take what the Messenger assigns to you and deny yourselves that which he withholds from you. And fear Allah; for Allah is strict in Punishment.

APPENDIX II

Relevant Constitutional Provisions Explaining The Ideological foundations of the Secular Socialist Democratic Republic of India

INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM OF RELIGION

Art.25 (1) Subject to public order, morality and health and to the other provisions of this Part, all persons are equally entitled to freedom of conscience and the right freely to profess, practice and propagate religion.

(2) Nothing in this article shall affect the operation of any existing law or prevent the state from making any law—

(One) regulating or restricting any economic, financial, political or other secular activity which may be associated with religious practice;

(b) providing for social welfare and reform or the throwing open of Hindu religious institutions of a public character to all classes and sections of Hindus.

Explanation I — The wearing and carrying of kirpans shall be deemed to be included in the profession of the Sikh religion.

Explanation II—In subclause (b) of clause (2), the reference to Hindus shall be construed as including a reference to persons professing the Sikh, Jain or Buddhist religion, and the reference to Hindu religious institutions shall be construed accordingly.

COLLECTIVE FREEDOM OF RELIGION

Art. 26 Subject to public order, morality and health, every religious denomination or any section thereof shall have the right —

(One) to establish and maintain institutions for religious and charitable purposes;

(Two) to manage its own affairs in matters of religion;

(Three) to own and acquire movable and immovable property; and

(Four) to administer such property in accordance with law.

Art.30 (1) All minorities, whether based on religion or language, shall have the right to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice.

(2) The state shall not, in granting aid to educational institutions, discriminate against any educational institution on the ground that it is under the management of a minority, whether based on religion or language.

NO COMMUNAL ELECTORATES

Art. 325 There shall be one general electoral roll for every territorial constituency for election to either House of Parliament or to the House or either House of the Legislature of a state and no person shall be ineligible for inclusion in any such roll or claim to be included in any special electoral roll for any such constituency on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex or any of them.

NO SPECIAL TAXES FOR PROMOTION OF RELIGION

Art. 27 No person shall be compelled to pay any taxes, the proceeds of which are specifically appropriated in payment of expenses for the promotion or maintenance of any particular religion or religious denomination.

Art. 290A A sum of forty-six lakhs and fifty thousand rupees shall be charged on, and paid out of, the Consolidated Fund of the state of Kerala every year to the Travancore Devaswom

Fund; and a sum of thirteen lakhs and fifty thousand rupees shall be charged on, and paid out of the consolidated Fund of the state of Madras every year to the Devaswom Fund established in that state for the maintenance of Hindu temples and shrines in the territories transferred to that state on the first day of November, 1956, from the state of Travancore-Cochin.

NO RELIGIOUS INSTRUCTION IN STATE EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS

Art.28 (1) No religious instruction shall be provided in any educational institution wholly maintained out of state funds.

(2) Nothing in clause (1) shall apply to an educational institution which is administered by the state but has been established under any endowment or trust which requires that religious instruction shall be imparted in such institution.

(3) No person attending any educational institution recognized by the state or receiving aid out of state funds shall be required to take part in any religious instruction that may be imparted in such institution or to attend any religious worship that may be conducted in such institution or in any premises attached thereto unless such person or, if such person is a minor, his guardian has given his consent thereto.

THE STATE AS A REFORMER

The [Central] Untouchability (Offences) Act. 1955 No. 22 of 1955.

Section 3

Punishment for enforcing religious disabilities. —

Whoever on the ground of 'untouchability' prevents any person —

(a) from catering any place of public worship which is open to other persons professing the religion or belonging to the same religious denomination or any section thereof as such person; or

(b) from worshipping or offering prayers or performing any religious service in any place of public worship, or bathing in, or using the waters of any sacred tank, well, spring or watercourse, in the same manner and to the same extent as is permissible to other persons professing the same religious denomination or any section thereof, of such person:

shall be punishable with imprisonment which may extend to six months, or with fine which may extend to five hundred rupees, or with both.

Explanation—For the purposes of this section ... persons professing the Buddhist, Sikh, or Jaina religion or persons professing the Hindu religion in any of its forms or developments including Virashaivas, Lingayats, Adivasis, followers of Brahma, Prarthana, Arya Samaj and the Swaminrayam Sampraday shall deemed to be Hindu.

The Bombay Hindu Places of Public Worship (Entry Authorization) Act, 1956 No. 31 of 1956.

Sections 2

Definition —In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires,

(a) 'place of public worship' whether a temple or by any other name called, to whomsoever belonging, which is dedicated to, or for the benefit of, or is used generally by, Hindus, Jains, Sikhs or Buddhists or any section or class

thereof, for the performance of any religious service or for offering prayers therein; and includes all lands and subsidiary shrines appurtenance attached to any such place, and also any sacred tanks, wells, springs and watercourses, the waters of which are worshipped, or are used for bathing or for worship;

(b) 'section' or 'class' of Hindus includes any divisions, subdivision caste, subcaste, sect or denomination whatsoever of Hindus.

Sections 3

Throwing open of Hindu temples to all classes and sections of Hindus—Notwithstanding any custom, usage or law for the time being in force, or the decree or order of a court, or anything contained in any instrument, to the contrary, every place of public worship which is open to Hindus generally, or to any section or class thereof, shall be open to all sections and classes of Hindus: and no Hindu of whatsoever section or class shall in any manner be prevented, obstructed or discouraged from entering such place of public worship, or from worshipping or offering prayers thereat or performing any religious service therein in the like manner and to like extent as any others Hindu of whatsoever section or class may so enter, worship, pray or perform.

UNIFORM CIVIL CODE FOR THE CITIZENS:

Article 44. The State shall endeavour to secure for the citizens a uniform civil code throughout the territory of India.

FUNDAMENTAL DUTIES:

Article 51A. [Part IVA]

It shall be the duty of every citizen of India —

(a) to abide by the Constitution and respect its ideals and

institutions, the National Flag and the National Anthem;
(b) to cherish and follow the noble ideals which inspired our national struggle for freedom;
(c) to uphold and protect the sovereignty, unity and integrity of India;
(d) to defend the country and render national service when called upon to do so;
(e) to promote harmony and the spirit of common brotherhood amongst all the people of India transcending religious, linguistic and regional or sectional diversities; to renounce practices derogatory to the dignity of women;
(f) to value and preserve the rich heritage of our composite culture;
(g) to protect and improve the natural environment including forests, lakes, rivers and wild life, and to have compassion for living creatures;
(h) to develop the scientific temper, humanism and spirit of inquiry and reform;
(i) to safeguard public property and to abjure violence;
(j) to strive towards excellence in all spheres of individual and collective activity so that the nation constantly rises to higher levels of endeavour and achievement.